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#### Anti-black violence is a paradigmatic constant that engenders human communities. The 1AC reiterates a chronopolitical grammar of progress that secures complicity for black dereliction.

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I argue that the white supremacy Spencer evinces, in which nonblack persons of color can be contributing members of human community, reinforces the constitutive exclusion of racially black persons from the Historical frame. The rub is that Spencer is not wrong. Racially black persons cannot be-in-time because as pre-human artifacts—the trace of humanism’s race/ism or cut—they bear the weight of Man’s ontological anxieties. The promise of a universal human imago implores nonblack persons of color to make room for themselves not in a vacuum, but in an Historical world (wound) adhered by racial hierarchies, such that by activating the plasticity of racial whiteness as a human recognition, they entrench the constitutive exclusion of racially black minorities from human be(com)ing. To refuse to capitalize on this plasticity, to refuse to reproduce the antiblack sentimentality and violence of Enlightenment Europe would consent to arriving to the table of human civilization too soon—at the dawn of Man, which is how Martin characterizes the African continent—and too late, failing altogether to qualify for the recognitions and protections reserved for human subjects of a civil polity. To be sure, civil rights necessitate human recognition because “civil society” is but a placeholder for the discursive and material organization of Man (i.e., Man’s racial myths and legal categories), and because the political economy of liberal humanism is generated within and through libidinal antiblackness. The episodic and contingent violence that nonblack persons of color experience (for example, in Trump’s America) is the affective lever civil society operates to demand generalized loyalty, obscuring for nonblack minorities the choice whereby they consent to make themselves the instruments of white supremacy. The mechanism through which that loyalty is elicited is not (just) the state’s demand but liberal—libidinal—humanism’s demand for a collective, planetary distancing from and rejection of racial blackness. A white qua not-black human imago is at once the subject of Alt-Right claims to exclusivity and liberal humanism’s claims to inclusivity. Ours is a world in which those who enjoy what Frantz Fanon describes as “ontological resistance”51 (i.e., human qua white recognition) experience, in Trump’s as in Obama’s America, the ebb and flow of human community (i.e., social life), while the excommunicated, or in Wilderson’s hauntingly apt analogy for racially black persons, the “cows”52—as the raw material that makes and sustains our human world-making—are indiscriminately and senselessly, without stipulation or explanation, “accumulated and, if need be, killed,”53 in order to cohere the collective unconscious of our human community and to engender its social markers of Man. Same shit, different day I have already suggested that Trump’s simulated inclusivity betrays the continuity of the office of the American president and that his arrival to the White/Master’s House coheres and testifies to a paradigm sutured by unremarkable and interminable antiblack violence, even or especially as nonblack minority populations experience new violations in Trump’s America. The contingent and selective recognition of nonblack persons of color as white-cum-human beings absolves—gives cover to—the enduring violence whereby the black as a subject-that-is-not-one is defeated by the protections liberal humanism’s political machinery—civil society—erects to safeguard Man in his most vulnerable iterations (i.e., “worker, woman, […] gay, lesbian, and so on”). While racialized violence reduces the nonblack body (of color) to flesh, nonblack persons of color and racially black persons do not occupy comparable space-time coordinates and/or structural positionalities, because humanism’s flesh-making project or race/ism is essentially an antiblack violence. Afro-pessimism teaches us that racially black persons occupy a structural position analogous, if at all, to non-human animal beings54, which like the slave acquire value in/as death—as a meaty carcass consumable/consumed for its parts, including skin, hair,55 bones, organs, and (the story of Henrietta Lacks teaches us) cells. It is for this reason that Wilderson uses the analogy of a meat-packing plant to replace the “negro question” with the “cow question,”56 and why Sexton describes the “paradigmatic condition of black existence in the modern world” as “a perpetual and involuntary openness”57 to the tearing apart and looting of black flesh. Hortense Spillers names the hyper-vulnerability of the unsignified/unsignifiable black flesh to remain from humanism’s cut as a “hieroglyphics.” She clarifies that the “anatomical specifications of rupture” assigned to black flesh invite “the objective description of laboratory prose”58—”eyes beaten out, arms, backs, skulls branded, a left jaw, a right ankle, punctured; teeth missing, as the calculated work of iron, whips, chains, knives … the bullet.”59 Surely, this is not the representational regime of a body [End Page 226] typified by cohesion. Wilderson’s, Sexton’s, and Spillers’ interventions are Afro-pessimistic60 insofar as they dissuade the reader from holding her breath for a political metamorphosis that might finally recognize black humanity. Black fungibility like animal fungibility (perhaps too, like earth-matter fungibility61) will abate only after an epistemological catastrophe disorganizes our relational capacities and dissolves every frame of reference, obliterating the chronopolitical grammar through which those who can become Man, that is to say, who can ascend to the top of a racial hierarchy that is also or primarily a food chain, do so. Franco Barchiesi elaborates the Afro-pessimistic position to remind us that “the shift from multicultural liberalism to nationalistic supremacism” in the hour of Trump “is a change only in the form of Black subjugation.”62 Black persons categorically denied human recognition as a fact and not (just) as an inconvenience of their being “do not merely confront [the] violence”63 nonblack minority populations like immigrants, indigenous persons, and nonblack gender non-conforming persons experience as an event—for example, as a travel ban or the dismissal of marriage and bathroom rights. Rather, black Others as a people forged, Audre Lorde explains, “in the crucibles of difference,”64 are “actually constituted by [violence] through processes of depredation, coercion, and enslavement.”65 Barchiesi’s incisive reading of Wilderson’s “Gramsci’s Black Marx” (2003) makes it clear that Trump’s presidency does not qualify as an historical node, which is to say, does not signify the end of times or a new time/beginning, but rather, evidences the longue durée of black social death as a world-ordering structure, more to the point, as the structure for our be(com) ing-human. It is precisely “the inhumanity of Blackness [that] allows White humans”66 including nonblack persons of color to build institutions, ideologies of freedom, images of rights, and ethical meditations on democracy. Such political and cognitive capacities posit [black] bodies as their inert, “socially dead,” Wilderson writes, yet sentient objects, or outlets of white fantasies of coercion, improvement, imagination, violence, and healing. The inhumanity of [blackness], or the fundamental antagonism between White life and [black] death, is ultimately the condition of existence for the political conflicts, moral dilemmas, and social emergencies of civil society, as well as its aptitude to experience and narrativize history as a succession of events.67 To argue that antiblack violence is paradigmatic—a structure and a constant—is to suggest that reforms to civil society will not abate the violence black Others necessarily must endure to make civil society, more to the point, to make or conceive of a social polity—an “us”—in the first place. Wilderson’s intervention, abridged by Barchiesi to clarify our present moment as altogether typical, insists that the reorganization [End Page 227] of civil society’s parts will not de-escalate the rates at which black persons are indiscriminately maimed and murdered, because black life is not contingently fungible but essentially so, and because the metaphysics and/as metapolitics of black fungibility are not just essential for the making of a socially dead black Other. They are principally and foremost essential for the making of a non-fungible or white-passing “us”.68 The story of that be(com)ing, of a human subject that is “semantically-neurochemically” programmed to enact antiblack “individual and collective behaviors,”69 is located in the hearts and minds of those eligible for human recognition, as a libidinal economy. Insofar as Trump and his henchmen (i.e., Spencer) use liberalism’s seemingly capacious parachute to trap the rights of nonblack minority populations, they mobilize not an American nightmare but one instance in the “ongoing disaster”70 of “the social” that is mobilized by the American Dream. Trump’s hate-mongering is our price of admission not just for a model of the social organized by/as civil society, but for the making of human community (i.e., the “social”), that is to say, for epistemology and ontology itself. Recall Hartman’s argument that “the very effort to pry apart the Negro question and the social question exposes their enduring entanglements”71 as a private relation. Libidinal interests, untouchable by the law but which determine the law72, “[shape] the emergence of the social in the United States”73 as a racially unified site in which the immigrant and savage find the civil rights that correspond with human recognition. While nonblack minorities in Trump’s America are being made to experience, albeit irregularly and provisionally, what Michael Harriot describes as “the America black people have always lived in,”74 which denies human recognition to revoke civil rights, for the black Other who lives in this nowhere or “sunken place,”75 it matters not who steers the American ship. Hillary Clinton’s presidency like Barack Obama’s before hers would have (at best) activated the elasticity whereby nonblack differences (in Obama’s America, gay and trans rights especially) are accommodated by entrenching the constitutive antagonism of racial blackness (such that the hour of the first black presidency testified to the fact that black lives don’t or can’t matter).76 The violent removal of Vietnamese-American doctor and ‘model minority’77 David Dao from United Flight 3411 on April 9, 2017 serves to illustrate what Damon Young of Very Smart Brothas describes as the contingent blackification of nonblack minority populations in Trump’s America. Young resolves that Dao “wasn’t quite [black] for a day,” but that he “was definitely treated like [he was].”78 The wanton and senseless nature of Dao’s physical beating rendered his body (of color) fungible as an event, because this violence defied his treatment otherwise, for example, in Obama’s multiculturalist, ‘post-racial’ America. More specifically, Dao’s psychological suffering in the video seen ‘round the globe evokes the psychosomatic terror (pace Fanon) typical of humanism’s flesh-making project, that is to say, its anti/blackness. The absolute wretchedness whereby Dao cannot articulate his suffering, his demonstration of a “pain [he] can’t live inside of and can’t live without,”79 indeed, of a pain which he cannot signify, contain, or cathect with recourse to “the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography”80 is expressed by the hopelessness with which Dao pleads with his captors to “just kill [him].” We might pause to ask why the video of Dao’s suffering captivated audiences as it did. Certainly, had Dao been black, the violation of his person would not have registered as a scandal. Videos of black suffering have the opposite effect, prompting us to stand not appalled and aghast but agape and mesmerized, chomping at the bit for (pace Hartman) more “scenes of subjection” that might (impossibly) satisfy our unabating human appetite for the flesh of the Other. In addition, scenes of black subjection function to reassure us that the human world will continue to make room for nonblack minority populations by discarding with the being of the black. Our absence from fugitive demands for black life—our sheer disregard of black fungibility, such that some of us can claim in the hour of Trump that “this is the first time [we’ve] protested anything”81—further suggests that black and nonblack minority populations do not wade through the muck and mire of racism together. Even as black persons show up to do our work, “[taking] up so many causes not immediately recognized as black,” for example, “the rights of Palestinians and Indigenous water protectors,”82 and even as nonblack minorities like Dao are violated in ways that testify to the interminability of antiblack political and (as) libidinal violence and to the consequences of that violence for nonblack persons of color, it is the black who has had to do the wading—the sinking and the dying—so that we who are not fungible can do the living.83 What is specific about and underwrites the antiblackness of this moment, if anything, is that audiences view Trump’s violence as exceptional, and in lamenting nonblack suffering in Trump’s America valorize the protections of the liberal state, obscuring its structural antiblackness.

#### Speculative political imagination re-elaborates the temporal prognoses that drain and imprison black energy.

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Does time heal all wounds? Or does time require certain wounds to sustain itself? Is the curative function of time an onto-metaphysical fantasy, one concealing the internecine operations of temporal subjugation? What happens to existence, or life itself, once we abandon time, its unquestioned positivity, and its presumed givenness (as gift, indispensable resource, or a priori condition)? Furthermore, is the activity of imagining even possible without recourse to time, temporality, or its durative schemas? Is the imagination a temporal captive, and does abandoning (or dare I say abolishing) time liberate the imagination to perform different tasks and pursuits? Questioning time is a difficult task, since thinking requires it (to re-orient existence beyond Newtonian, post-modern, or neo-liberal time and eschatology). Questioning, as meta-commentary, would require an exceptional position, both within and without time simultaneously, a position capable of investigating the very thing that enables investigation—holding time in abeyance. But the seeming impossibility of this enterprise would require a different noetic apparatus, since thought (as questioning) depends on time as its oxygen. The imagination, then, offers the promise of liberation from temporal tyranny, an enterprise contravening the conditions of reason, knowledge, forms, and, indeed, the possible itself. The potential “transgression”—to use a hackneyed term in American Studies—of the imagination is diminished, however, when it is bound to democracy. Democracy tethers the imagination to time, since democracy is an elaborate schematization, instrumentalization, and defense of time. During any moment of political and social crisis, we are importuned to re-imagine democracy, as imagining the future. To consider democracy futureless, or that its time has run out, or that futurity (and progress) is its devastating temporal myth, is to open oneself up to charges of theoretical heresy, despair, hopelessness, and any other abject calumny. In times of crisis, when the authoritarian kernel of democracy is exposed, theorists call on time to hold inconsistencies, resolve contradictions, blackmail hope, and repair brokenness. Once again, we land in the terrain that “time heals all wounds,” political or otherwise. Samuel A. Chambers defines the imagination as a “synthetic power of creation and re-creation—an ability to combine the uncombinable, to surpass binaries without merely collapsing them, to fashion something new” (620). And from such synthesis, we are told that a democratic imagination is possible, since we would “think the limits (and their transgression) of democratic theory and of democracy as well” (620). Here, we see that the democratic imagination recasts limits as possibilities rather than complete failures. Limits become the resource for creation and re-creation rather than evidence of destruction and uselessness. A couture Kantianism / Hegelianism (mixed with a splash of deconstruction) salvages democracy from the perils of its absurdity, devastation, and brutality. Why this investment in democracy’s “intrinsic” creative power? Can this creativity finally bring an end to anti-Black violence and Black suffering? Or is the knowledge of democracy’s fabulousness enough to sustain Blacks through police terrorism, environmental racism, re-enslavement through incarceration, and food / housing insecurity and discrimination? I would suggest that what makes such creative synthesis possible is an unacknowledged dependence on time. For proponents of democracy, it is time that is malleable for creative enterprises of re-imagination, of progress fetishization, and an “ontology of change” that need not justify (or prove) itself, declaration of change seems to be enough (Badiou, “Ontology”). What if, however, democracy is clinging to a depleted resource? What if time is no longer enough to orient existence, especially for those inhabitants of an abyss—within which time, space, ethics, and law are weaponized against existence? Put somewhat differently, democracy has exhausted the imagination. It is a speculative vampire that drains the imagination of any vital resource for its own survival. This speculation is an outrageous expenditure of energy, an enjoyment without end, a scholarly surplus-pleasure requiring an incessant (and useless) political repetition (Johnston). I would describe this speculation—the conjoining of time, democracy, and the imagination—as an interminable quest, or a certain “stuckness” in a scene of failure (a constant encircling of political and legal vacuity). This repetition is most dramatically demonstrated, for me, in Black political participation—voting, protesting, keeping hope alive, returning to the kernel of authoritarian violence (i. e., anti-Blackness) with unbridled hope, temporal determination, and an investment in the ontology of change (Warren; Farred). Time mocks Blacks, requiring historical déjà vu to be re-imagined, redeemed, rethought, or ignored, rather than accepting time as anti-Black enmity and democracy as the permanence of anti-Blackness. Chants of “yes we can!” “your vote matters!” “we have power!” “we’re moving forward,” etc., serve to neglect the failure of Black political participation and to imprison the imagination within futurity. As I am writing these remarks, I am witnessing the absurdity of this democratic imagination and its unrelenting time. On one news program, I hear that police shot unarmed Andre Hill, a forty-seven-yearold Black resident of Columbus, Ohio, without cause, and rather than offering him medical assistance, decided to handcuff him (just in case the supine, dying man finds a gun, magically, I guess). On the other news program, I hear Black politicians importuning, begging, and guilting Blacks into voting for change. Black political pundits assure voters that the ontology of change is realizable if you just exercise your right to vote. “Never again!” “We will transform police practices!” “This time will be different!” Did Blacks not vote when police shot twelve-year-old Tamir Rice as he was playing with his toy gun on the playground? (By the way, no federal charges will be brought against the police officers who shot him). Did Blacks not vote when Sandra Bland lost her life in police custody? Did Blacks not vote after police deprived Eric Garner and George Floyd (and apparently 70 other people) of breath (Baker et al.)? In answer to my inquiry “why should we continue to vote if anti-Black violence is not changing?” I am told, “Just keep believing, we can vote people in that can change things!” When I then ask, “But I voted for President Obama (suspending my nihilism in an intoxication of hope-affect), I thought things were going to change for Blacks? I feel just as unsafe and endangered post-Obama as pre-Obama,” I am told, “Obama wasn’t a ‘magic Negro.’ He did the best he could.” Then I ask, “So why vote if it will take an act of magic to address the existential threat of anti-Blackness?” Time mocks the cyclical movement of such inquiries, they are, indeed, unanswerable within the creative, synthetic, and powerful democratic horizon. Voting becomes the premier instrument of the democratic imagination—supposedly, it activates the imagination with futurity, avoids paralysis with action, and can be repeated. What type of creativity will finally eradicate anti-Black brutality? And could such creativity even operate within time? Could we still call such creativity democracy? Must we abandon time to enable the imagination to perform the mystical, the magical, and the ineffable? If we have understood nihilism as the entrapment (and misery) of metaphysics, the reduction of Being to value circulation (axio-ontology) and Being’s forgottenness, and the neutralization of various hierarchies of existence and legitimacy (Vattimo), then Black nihilism would suggest that time is not a natural right or intrinsic resource. Time is a supreme onto-metaphysical value that traffics in anti-Black violence, subjugation, destruction, and must also be reduced to myth, fantasy, and displaced. Rather than providing the resource for creativity and power, time is a racial privilege that embeds itself in Being and metaphysics—it anchors the human and engenders extreme brutality and destructive pleasure. It is impossible, then, to de-link time from the anti-Black violence saturating it. Enterprises such as Black politics and democratic imagination reproduce the “same” rather than introducing a break in violence. Put differently, the democratic imagination takes time for granted as a natural right or unquestioned condition of existence, rather than bringing this condition under investigation and suspicion; reproducing time, as a creative and synthetic activity, is its primary preoccupation. Black existence exposes time as an unreliable lure, one vested in certain onto-metaphysical fantasies. I would add to Vittorio Possenti’s remarkable anatomizing of nihilism—theoretical, moral, theological, technological, and judicial—spatio-temporal nihilism, since both space and time provide problems for Black thinking in the abyss and demand a protocol of thinking (or imagination?) that is released from the preconditions of Being and ethics. Black nihilism de-idealizes both space and time as offering anything intrinsically or potentially transformative. Thus, the limit of space and time, for Black existence, cannot be re-worked into anything life-affirming or synthesized into anything meaningful. To put a finer point on this reflection: Anti-Blackness is a problem of time and the democratic imagination. Police shootings and COVID-19 deaths, for example, foreground the failure of time to alleviate Black suffering. Time is not curative; it is a weapon of tremendous violence. Despite the optimism of Black political theorists, time entraps Black thinking in a web of contradictions, absurdities, and impasses. The pathetic theorizing of Melvin Rogers, for example in his “Between Pain and Despair: What Ta-Nehisi Coates Is Missing,” presents an incredibly impoverished, unreliable, and inept reading of Black pessimism and the crisis of Black existence—it links democratic action to the imagination and clings to an “ontology of change” despite all evidence to the contrary in Black life. His work, however, represents a coterie of Black political optimists so ~~blinded~~ by democracy’s promise that they consider Black pain a form of political possibility. It is a perverse enterprise capitalizing on what we might call black jouissance—futurity constitutes the “temporal material” for surplus-pleasure in Black suffering, travail, and political failure. If there is any hope for the imagination and its endless circulation in contemporary Black thought, it will need to abandon time and refuse its seductions. The future is but one temporal value we must de-idealize and insert into an anti-Black will to power—one wreaking havoc across the globe. In these desperate times, Black existence needs a liberated imagination, an imagination liberated from formal thought, the world, destructive transcendence and immanence, and dogmatic preconditions. So, why continue to expend energy re-imagining the future and democracy? Let us focus Black imagining on enterprises that sustain us in the abyss. Outlining and presenting such enterprises requires tremendous spiritual and intellectual energy—but such investment is all we have.

#### Maintaining US dominance is unsustainable and reproduces racial hierarchies on a global scale.

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The overall finding is that liberal internationalist thinking/theory is, in effect (albeit unconsciously on the part of its proponents), a legitimating ideology rather than an effective explanatory frame for understanding the way in which the LIO actually works. That conclusion is reached, in part, by suggesting the applicability of a rather different perspective on the operations of the LIO and US power: specifically, a synthesized Gramscian–Kautskyian framework, explained below.

The key point is that the LIO is a class-based, elitist hegemony—strongly imbued with explicit and implicit racial and colonial/imperial assumptions—in both US domestic and foreign relations. At home, this analysis helps to explain in part the phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ white working/middle class, including the affluent but economically anxious voters whose salience on the right has transformed US politics since the Reagan revolution of the 1980s.2 Responding to the (minorities’) rights revolution of the 1960s, and the loss of economic opportunity and decline in living standards due to technological change and the global redistribution of industry,3 white working- and middle-class voters drifted towards the Republicans as the party of low taxes and fiscal conservatism.4 This delivered little in material terms, however; and, as inequality increased with market freedom and real wages stagnated, workers in the ‘rust belt’ and other areas grew increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo of establishment politics, their frustration exacerbated by anxieties about ethno-racial diversity and American identity as the United States moves towards a society in which whites are a minority.5 The result was the election as president in 2016 of Donald Trump on an overtly anti-conservative and barely concealed white identity platform at home and a programme of protectionism and non-interventionism—America First—abroad.6

Yet political dissatisfaction or disaffection was not confined to the political right.7 ‘Occupy Wall Street’ and other movements and groups vented their anger at the inequalities of power, wealth and income, particularly in the wake of the Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis.8

In external policy, the analysis helps to explain the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of the US readily embracing a more diverse international order, as well as the character of that very embrace.9 Accepting nations of the global South on an equal footing may become a strategic necessity, but the process remains problematic given the racialized discourses of western power over the past several centuries, fortified in the United States by the experience of the slave trade, slavery, the ‘Jim Crow’ era, Orientalist views of Asians, and other factors.10 Class power helps to explain the strategic embrace of foreign elites as the sources of change and the agents of American influence, however diluted it may have been due to target states’ national interest considerations. Those at the apex of America’s hierarchies sought to forge alliances with and incorporate their foreign elite counterparts— with their full cooperation—in South Korea and China.11 Hence, the liberal internationalist ‘successes’ in the cases of South Korea and China must be qualified by considering the repercussions of developing market-oriented societies marked by economic inequality, rising social unrest and varying degrees of political repression. In ‘successful’ China and South Korea, as in India and other emerging powers, there remain major challenges underpinned by profound inequalities in power, wealth and income, associated with a politics that is frequently class-based but also heavily racialized and xenophobic.12

Why choose South Korea and China as key cases? Although these are two very different states, varying in global significance, and analysed at different periods of historical time, they do allow us to test out important claims made by liberal internationalists. South Korea is considered as a key test at the very birth of the US-led order—at a time when we might expect the new principles embodied in the UN, such as the rule of law, the lessons of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, the Geneva Conventions and the rights of civilians in combat zones, to be pursued with some determination if not fully achieved. Given the fervour of anti-colonialism at the time, and US claims to champion that cause, we might also expect the behaviour of the international system’s leading power to differ sharply from that of colonial rulers in what became known as the Third World. The case of South Korea tells us a great deal about the practical application of a new international system developed by US power within an international system of rules, applicable to hegemon and others alike, a key liberal internationalist claim.

China’s integration into the US-led international system from the late 1970s also tells us a great deal about the character of the international order, especially about how significant change is managed within it and what the embrace of diversity means in practical terms. By the 1970s, the US-led order was facing challenges, of course—from West Germany and Japan, for example, and the oil-producing states—not to mention demands from the G77 for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and was also recovering from defeat in Vietnam and the legitimacy crisis following the Watergate scandal. For liberal internationalists, the integration of China is claimed as a success story both for the liberal order and for China. Yet, without denying the country’s dramatic increase in economic power, I question the character of China’s success, given the high levels of internal turmoil and the extremes of inequality that are giving rise to major political and economic instability. China, then, is a test of the claim that the liberal order rewards societies as a whole; a Gramscian–Kautskyian counter-argument would suggest that it is largely the Chinese ruling elite and its business allies, not the mass of ordinary Chinese, who have been accommodated in the US-led international system.

Liberal internationalism: theory, ideology, practice

Liberal internationalism is an ambiguous, multifaceted approach to understanding, explaining, justifying and practising international politics. One aspect of it is as a positive theory taught in academic International Relations (IR), derived from liberalism as applied to international affairs, explaining how the foreign policies of leading states, especially the United States and Britain, work. It is also a normative world-view, used by some of its proponents to indicate what the world ought to look like and how it might, and frequently does, work. Liberal internationalism, therefore, is also a set of policies, institutions and established practices.13

As an IR theory, the key pillars of liberalism, as embodied in liberal societies, are limited government, individual freedom, private property, pluralism and tolerance, progress, institutions and cooperation for peace, and interdependence. As a theory of US foreign policy, which is the object of analysis here, it encompasses democratic values, economic interdependence, international institutions as a framework for cooperation in addressing global crises and problems, and the broad promotion of general welfare. Emerging historically from the era of rising anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, with the United States and Britain in the lead, the US-led order laid claims to being opposed to colonial rule, and in favour of national and human rights, within a system of international power undergirded by rules binding hegemon and others alike. It was promoted not as a continuation of empire by other means, but as a new system based on universalistic principles applicable to all regardless of race, colour or history.

For my immediate purposes, it is unnecessary to disentangle the positive from the normative, the theoretical from the practical, because this framework of thought emerges both from deep principles and also as a set of solutions to international problems, especially world wars. Hence, liberal internationalism is frequently referred to as Wilsonianism, after the internationalist programme promulgated by US President Woodrow Wilson after the First World War that included the formation of the League of Nations, the forerunner of the longer-lasting post-1945 United Nations system.

I argue here that, as a theory, it operates as ideological legitimation even when its proponents offer reform; it justifies the status quo. In that regard it differs little overall from other theories like Marxism, for example, or realism. But because it is the principal system of ideas and practices, and ideals, that are used to explain, implement and defend the present international status quo, I would suggest that it elides too much to be fully validated beyond the circle of its proponents. Of course, it explains aspects of the world’s functioning; but its interpretation tends to be benign: crises and challenges are explained as resolvable within the system’s governing principles through socialization, integration and assimilation.

I use the term liberal internationalism, then, as an amalgam to suggest that, while it is all of the above, upon reflection it serves within academia and in IR as a positive theory of how things actually are—that is, as the opposite of an ideology. It purports to be able to explain the world, at the same time as its adherents are normative supporters of the theory. I show that it is actually ideological, because it elides key factors of how the liberal world order actually works, and that other theories suggest better ways of explaining the world.

In the next section of the article, I analyse liberal internationalist ideas and claims in more depth and more critically, with a view to identifying key elements of a more viable framework to explain the LIO—a critical theory influenced by the work of Antonio Gramsci and to some extent synthesized with the work of Karl Kautsky. The principal aim of this article is to identify the weaknesses of liberal internationalism in practice with the purpose of opening space for subsequent theorizing. In sum, what appears to be missing from liberal internationalism is any recognition of domestic power inequalities—such as those based on class and race—its broad attachment to (democratic) elitism, and its hierarchical approach to other powers, especially in the global South.

While Wilsonian liberal internationalism is widely recognized as privileging a belief in the free movement of people, capital, goods and services, less attention has been given to its origins in a time when ‘international relations’ was overtly understood as ‘race relations’, and its consequent implication in managing overtly racialized imperial power after the First World War.14 The Wilson administration’s role in racially segregating the US federal government had its foreign policy counterpart in a belief in an eventual, but far distant, self-government of the colonies and opposition to a Japanese proposal for a racial equality clause in the charter of the fledgling League of Nations.15 The development of liberal internationalism, then, was symbiotically bound to Wilson’s conviction that US intervention in world affairs was essential, and to what were effectively parastatal organizations created both by the federal executive and by private foundations—the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, among others. Wilsonian ‘theory’ was practical, idealistic and ideological from the very beginning. It is also the case that, long after overt racial discourses became politically damaging, subliminal racial thinking remained—and (unconsciously) remains—a significant element of liberal internationalism, affecting its analyses of the politics of domestic and global demographic power shifts.16

Nevertheless, liberal internationalists are cosmopolitans—opposed to narrow nationalism and trade protectionism, within a US-led international system. But its core ideas—rule of law, superiority of the western idea (however lightly worn), a rules-based institutional order open to all, in principle—are deeply embedded in US political-intellectual elite think-tanks, university public policy schools, corporate media and the leaderships of both main political parties,17 the core of the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment.18 Importantly, however, there are influential voices in the emerging powers and regions that support the liberal international order by calling for internal reform to take account of the changing distribution of global power away from the West and towards the ‘rest’.19

The upshot is a broad consensus around certain core ideas: that the post-1945 rules-based world order, whatever its weaknesses, serves the world well by spreading prosperity and maintaining peace; and that, although it cannot continue unreformed, the US-led system draws on deep resources—economic, military, systemic and ‘soft’—that bestow upon it continuing strengths to contain, engage, manage and socialize emerging powers. Charles Kupchan lists a range of problems requiring US leadership, even if only within a suitably reformed international system reflecting ‘the real distribution of power’.20

John Ikenberry of Princeton University, the leading proponent of this school of thought, makes significant claims as well as several unquestioned assumptions, undeveloped allusions to core powers’ violent and other connections with the periphery, and a number of significant silences. He claims, for example, that the United States is a fully functioning democracy, yet fails to acknowledge evidence of the power of racialized, class-based elites. For critical theorists, such as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Craig Murphy,21 the international relations of elites across states and societies operate to reproduce extant patterns of power and manage or engineer change to the benefit of elites in a generally zero-sum game in which broad masses and lower classes lose out. This is clearly a far cry from liberal internationalist claims associated with the benefits of globalization, notwithstanding proposed ameliorative remedies against the harshest effects. Likewise, claims about the centrality of the rule of law occlude consideration of significant violations in practice. The question of imperial power is hardly addressed, and there is a general Eurocentric neglect of the significance of global areas beyond the core to the ‘welfare’ and cohesion of the core itself. There is a clear link between Ikenberry’s overt theory of American democracy and its liberal-hegemonic world role. The United States, and the western order it built, is characterized as a pluralistic liberal market democracy that is broadly inclusive and tolerant of ethnic diversity. The US-built security community exhibits its leading state’s internal character as a plural one and, very significantly, one in which the United States is bound by rules.22 Yet liberal internationalists’ underlying assumptions effectively deny the findings of numerous well-researched studies challenging American democracy’s principal claims.23

As far as Ikenberry and Deudney (and many others) are concerned, the ‘western idea’ is a significant part of the strength of the US-led order.24 The West, a spectacularly successful ‘civilizational heritage’, was underpinned by America’s New Deal liberalism, and extended globally via Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and NATO. In effect, this vision and programme aimed to defuse domestic class conflict and the threat of war through ‘activist government, political democracy, and international alliance’. That system is in principle capable of assimilating emerging powers, given the universalism of its values and its tolerance of ethnic differences, although others joining this privileged grouping are expected to conform to its rules and accept US leadership. Western order is exclusive also because special rules apply within its zone of peace. Beyond it, conversely, other rules apply—cruder, neo-imperial and violent, although the implications of this contrast are left unaddressed.25 By drawing a line around the West, Ikenberry cuts off the rest of the world while addressing questions about the sources of world order which, empirically, lie in a symbiotic relationship between core and periphery. Yet, even within the ‘greater’ West, Japan and South Korea were not accorded the same treatment as western Europe.26 The LIO really was conceived and developed as a system of the West and the rest, in a zero-sum game. As Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, noted on Twitter in May 2017, the whole point of ‘Euro-Atlanticism’ was to ‘prevent post-West world order’.27

Yet the claim persists that this is no empire, despite America’s privileged place at the top of the ‘hierarchical political order’, because its hegemony is built on ‘consent’ and bounded by law. Power, which was necessary at the creation, faded away as consensual hegemony developed. This interpretation, of course, elides America’s overwhelming military superiority, including in and over Europe. Beyond Europe, however, Ikenberry concedes that American hegemony remained hierarchical, ‘with much fainter liberal characteristics’,28 again closing off an avenue of analytical and empirical analysis that might threaten the intellectual edifice of the LIO.

The (unconsciously) racialized world-view of Ikenberry’s Eurocentrism is subtly buttressed by Walter Russell Mead’s exploration of the significance of superior Anglo-Saxons who win wars, build world structures, and govern efficiently owing to ethno-cultural, not biological, characteristics.29 Mead’s interpretation of Anglo-Saxonism makes it appear benign, assimilative and universal— a scaffolding to support Ikenberry’s more overtly institutional analysis.

Assimilating minorities, however, is not embracing diversity—learning from other cultures and creating something new; it is maintaining conformity to the cultures of the powerful, dominant group.30 Looking to the future, as new global powers emerge, Mead advises America to both embrace and contain them, retaining military superiority should ‘rising’ powers become ‘opponents’.31 Mead complements the prescriptions of other liberal-realist internationalists, all seeking to incorporate, assimilate and mobilize emerging powers to absorb difference and produce conformity.

The liberal view is challenged by scholars who argue that the New Deal order effectively represented a political compromise, made in order to attain class peace and greater productivity, that mainly benefited major corporations while incorporating organized labour and thereby drawing its teeth. The postwar settlement was a narrow one—excluding racial minorities, unskilled and unorganized labour, and women—and relied on war and a heavily militarized economy that arose with the war in Korea and led directly to that in Vietnam.32 Liberal internationalists’ accounts elide the class, gendered and racial bases of the order, both at home and abroad. Ikenberry paints an appealing picture of a liberal order that delivered material benefits and security to all, while also raising some doubts about the operation of the system, especially with regard to the inequality of rewards generated by globalization and its potential political consequences. Those consequences are regarded by Ikenberry as posing the greatest threats to the stability of the liberal order, laying bare a central mechanism and dynamic of the system itself: market-driven class inequality, exacerbated in a society in which racialized class politics is salient.33 Yet Ikenberry never mentions class, race or gender—an omission central to critical theories of the making of the LIO.34

The other key omission is the role played in building the order by violence and outright war—not just the Second World War but also the Korean War, the ‘hot’ war at the birth of the order that propelled the formation of NATO, the rearmament of Germany, the security alliance with Japan and indeed the US military–industrial complex.35 Accordingly, a key focus of consideration here is wartime planning for a new world order and the manner of its foundation as a direct result of military violence that violated the UN Charter, international law, the lessons of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Wars ‘out there’ secured the core ‘over here’.36

And, of course, what is referred to as benign ‘liberal internationalism’ is what Mark Mazower refers to as ‘imperial internationalism’—trying to maintain a global hierarchy established by centuries of colonial and semi-colonial rule over what is now called the global South.37

Finally, the construction of the postwar western order was constitutive of a political, social, economic and ideological ‘vital center’, as Schlesinger terms it38—opposed to both right-wing nationalists and left-wing anti-imperialists. This entailed the acceptance by core forces of the ‘New Deal order’ that the price of class harmony, stability and mobility at home was the export and continuation of inequality,39 and therefore military violence, on the periphery; and that the removal of vast quantities of raw materials required a global military basing strategy, both to protect allied trade and to deny it to adversaries.40 Ikenberry accurately notes that the internal character of the leading state in the liberal order has an impact on the international system it built; but I diverge from his presentation of this impact as the externalization of a democratic regime. He elides the racial, class and gendered character of American historical, economic and political development—including that of Wilsonianism itself.41 His conclusion, however, is accurate, even if he fails to recognize its significance in the building and maintenance of the liberal order: ‘Access to resources and markets, socioeconomic stability, political pluralism, and American security interests—all were inextricably linked.’42

The framework that may best fit the actual underlying engine of liberal orderbuilding and maintenance, however, must also incorporate understanding of the ‘soft’ processes of socialization or incorporation. Violence is a powerful tool, but always and everywhere it is connected with the processes of non-violent elite socialization and alliance-building. It is one of the great strengths of Ikenberry’s analysis of international order that elite socialization is considered so significant.43 Yet a critical view of elite socialization in the building and perpetuation of hegemony views it not as a reflection of a democratic and benign foreign policy, but as incorporation into hegemonic agendas or ‘domestication’.44 In the Gramscian perspective, capitalist Great Powers, including the United States, are deeply unequal at home and imperialistic abroad, ultimately pursuing the interests of their ruling classes and elites, whether embedded in private, public or state– private realms.45 Their hegemony is a combination of persuasion and coercion involving a ‘state–society complex’.46 Admittedly, liberalism gives an account of elite socialization processes that overlaps with Gramscian approaches. However, liberal approaches see it as relatively benign, politically neutral or representative of democracy/popular sovereignty.

#### Trust-busting restores individualist competition and agency to a market of white masculine subjects.

Muncy 97, associate professor of history at the University of Maryland. (Robyn, Fall 1997, “Trustbusting and White Manhood in America, 1898-1914”, *American Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pg. 26-27)---typo edited, brackets denote a change

For organized labor in the early twentieth century, "independence" referred to a workers' ability to unite with other workers to gain some control over their working lives. One labor journalist wrote: "The methods of the trade unionists of America . . . free labor from a slavish dependence either upon the unstable philanthropy or the contemptuous labor trafficking which are features of today's multi-millionaires."34 Another insisted that the goal of unionization was "to improve the standard of life, to uproot ignorance and foster education, to instill character, manhood, and independent spirit among our people. . . ." "If the workers are to be deprived of their opportunities for self-improvement and independence;" this last writer continued, "if they are to be held at the will of the employer . . . the industrial condition of our country would sink lower than that of slavery."35

Anti-union trusts, then, threatened workingmen's independence as well as that of middle-class men, and working-class men connected their manly identities with this independence. Gompers, for instance, argued that corporate attempts to break unions constituted an "effort to curb and crush American manhood and its spirit of sovereignty and independence."36 Speaking of U.S. Steel, the AFL leader said, "The gigantic trust . . . has used and is using its great wealth and power in an effort to rob the toilers, not only of their livelihood, but of their rights of American manhood. . . ." He believed that the only hope for limiting the trusts' influence over American life lay in the "virile power" of organized labor. Finally, workers striking U.S. Steel needed support from fellow workers "to maintain themselves, their wives, and little ones ... so that their independence, character, and American conception of manhood may be sustained. . . ."37

In the 1912 presidential election, Gompers supported Woodrow Wilson, who agreed that trusts [undermined] underminded American manhood. During the campaign, Wilson exaggerated the earlier analogy between a salaried man and a servant, invoking instead the metaphor of master and slave. Wilson represented his most powerful opponent's plan to regulate big business as a consummation of the partnership between monopolies and the federal government, which would create, in Wilson's words, "a master." "I don't care how benevolent the master is going to be," Wilson warned, "I will not live under a master. That is not what America was created for … Benevolence developed a man or a nation.”38

Wilson's words and those of other trustbusters embodied the belief that economic independence - defined differently by middle-and working-class men - had been the foundation of American manhood. Acceptance of large corporations and government regulation, they thought, threatened that independence. Indeed, some Americans - perhaps the majority in 1912 - could not imagine manliness without independence.

NONCOMBATANTS

As Wilson's analogy between a salaried man and a slave suggests, the manhood at issue in battles between trustbusters and their opponents was specifically white manhood. This was evidenced further by the fact that black Progressives rarely participated in the debate. For instance, the Crisis, journal- istic organ of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and voice of many black progressives, did not devote one single article or editorial to government policy toward big business from 1911-1913, years when policy toward corporations was hotly debated in the white-dominated press. Indeed, only one column mentioned trusts at all, and it was a brief article on a black community in Alabama that was built on land somehow ceded by the state legislature to an interstate power company. The community was going to court to protest.39

#### Black captivity gives referential meaning to economic agency. Their telos of financial autonomy and market volition conserves slavery to secure its conceptual integrity.

Hardin & Towns 19, \*Carolyn, Assistant Professor of Media and Communication & American Studies @ Miami University. \*\*Armond R., Department of Communication Studies @ The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (December 2019, “Plastic Empowerment: Financial Literacy and Black Economic Life”, *American Quarterly*, Volume 71, Number 4, pg. 980-981)

Elsewhere Wynter claims that the proto-notion of homo economicus that circulated in the sixteenth century underwent important transformations by the nineteenth century. Further removed from Judeo-Christianity, conceptions of economic rationality in the nineteenth century functioned in raced form to articulate both black and indigenous populations in the “New World” as the epitome of economic irrationality. Wynter notes that by the nineteenth century, the black slave “would now be made into the physical referent of the ostensibly most racially inferior and non-evolved Other to Man, itself redefined as optimally homo economicus.”70 The black slave is in effect the defining opposite of homo economicus, that nonbeing who is less than human and/ or not human at all. Where homo economicus is self-interested and free to choose—the subject who can fulfill the ultimate human goal of surplus accumulation on his own—the slave is utterly removed from not only this goal but even the possibility of choosing or acting within the construct of the self.

W. E. B. Du Bois suggested the white worker’s choice and the black slave’s absence of choice were important components of the capitalistic distinction between blackness and whiteness. Du Bois argued white workers always held out hope that “they themselves might also become planters by saving money, by investment, by the power of good luck.”71 Black slaves come into existence not as exploited, which is to say “free” to sell their labor (choice), but expropriated in ways that mirror the extraction of natural resources.72 Another way to say this is that the slave, much like the tree or cattle, for Frank Wilderson,73 is the ground on which human capitalist exploitation stands. Julia Ott’s comprehensive review of research on slave capital bears this out: the transatlantic slave trade and slave-based Southern US commodity production created modern capitalism, financing transformations in technology, industry, and economy more thoroughly than any other capital input.74

Ian Baucom explains the connection between the objecthood of black slave bodies and the economic rationality of finance.75 According to Baucom, it was the transatlantic slave trade that birthed the modern financial calculation of value through insurance on slaves. The value of slave bodies as chattel, which could, if circumstances demanded, be cast overboard from a slave ship facing turbulent seas, was guaranteed in advance for the owners of slave ships by insurance policies. The calculation of the cost of that insurance was a foundational form of what Baucom variously terms “actuarial historicism” or “theoretical realism,” which are forms of rationality that “ground value in the loss of the singular and the invention of the average.”76 In other words, insurance on slave bodies evacuated their singularity more completely even than enslavement, rendering them placeholders of value, which could be converted into paper money either through exchange or through the exercise of an insurance contract once they were cast overboard. For Baucom, the modern credit economy and finance capitalism itself are founded on the reification of speculative values that the insured transatlantic trade in black slaves inaugurated. In his formulation, it is the white slave trader or actuary who can see through the “thingliness” of the objects of slavery to calculate their speculative value, embodying the “speculative culture of finance capital” that has much in common with the economic rationality invoked in the calculation of the abstract cost of “free” checking accounts, despite their very real lived costs for poor customers.77

These dynamics did not end with slavery. The twentieth century is rich with examples of outerdetermined black objecthood within capitalism.78 The 1939 Federal Housing Authority Underwriting Manual that served as both guide and tool for suburbanization in the US not only ratified the practice of “redlining” whereby neighborhoods of black families were drawn out of mortgage lending, but actually directed homeowners to use racial covenants to prevent black people from moving into their neighborhoods.79 Both redlining and racial covenants acted on black homeowners and potential buyers, making them objects to be circumscribed and excluded. They also prevented black people from becoming privileged subjects of the American mortgage boom, which was built and protected for those consumers who fit within the racialized subject position of homo economicus.

#### Extinction discourse violently subsumes Black suffering into a monolithic conception of human collectivity.

Douglass 21, assistant professor of gender, sexuality, and feminist studies at Duke University. (Patrice D., March 2021, “Unnatural Causes: Racial Taxonomies, Pandemic, and Social Contagion”, *Prism: Theory and Modern Chinese Literature*, 18:1, pg. 262-263, https://doi.org/10.1215/25783491-8922273)

In “Blackness and the Pitfalls of Anthropocene Ethics,” Axelle Karera interrogates discourses of disaster and crisis in relation to perceptions of ecological disaster. Karera contends that analyses of the immense of disaster are predicated on an insistence on collectivity that is bolstered by racial erasure. Thus, the discussion of the Anthropocene by many theorists presupposes a Human or ecological teleological progression, together with threats of demise that ahistorically subsume Blackness into a collective form of being that is central to Black suffering. Karera argues that, “insofar as the constant recognition of our existential interdependency cannot substantially challenge the many forms of segregations on the steady rise in our current times, it seems to me that assuming the inevitability of our ontological entanglement may need some re-thinking.”24 After citing the work of Fred Moten in relation to what she calls “relationality’s inability to maintain its ethical currency when faced with the extended rupture blackness sustains on ethics,” Karera continues, “In other words, relationality is inherently not only a position that the black cannot afford or even claim. The structure of relationality is essentially the condition for the possibility of their enslavement. I wonder, therefore, whether our naïve reliance on a type of inherent co-dependence has recently done more harm than good—that is to say, has instead worked to obstruct the very possibility of a positive transformation of our ethical sensibilities.”25 According to Karera, the linking of structural relationality to the conditions of slavery is key. For Blackness, segregation, interdependency, and slavery are relational rather than legally imposed. As such, the interdependence thesis (that we are all in this together) overshadows how the social structuring of Black life and death makes the collective “we” a structurally impossible equivalency, despite the affective and emotional desire for such to be true. Integration also constitutes a problem of relationality or the lack thereof. More to the point, the constitution of “we” is a form of violence that makes the particularities of Black suffering indiscernible under the auspices of equal rights and liberties in private and public spaces. In this respect, Hartman contends that “a slippage between race and status can be detected in the uncertain identi­fi­cation of the source of black degradation,” where the locus of suf­fering is frequently underscored because of the insistence on perceiving the problem as the lack of relational congruency across races with respect to specific phenomenon like global sickness.26 Rather, the conditions of suf­fering must be scaled outward, rather than inward with a narrow focus on pandemic and disease, to address the ethical stakes at the heart of Black death. Thus, employing Karera’s “positive transformation of our ethical sensibilities” to address the conditions of Gatewood’s death requires an acknowledgment of negligence on the part of Beaumont Hospital, together with a cognitive mapping of how care, protection, and safety as conceptual frameworks isolate Blackness as an excisable contagion that is subjected to gratuitous violence that so often leads to spectacularized or muted death. By muted death, I mean forms of death produced by anti-Blackness that go unseen, unaccounted for, or unknown.

#### The alternative affirms an insurgent black feminine otherwise that disarticulates Man’s chronopolitical order.

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If Afro-pessimism is necessarily a black feminism—Wilderson explains, “Afro-pessimism is made possible by the critical labors of a particular strand of Black feminism, a la [Saidiya] Hartman and [Hortense] Spillers”137—then its critique, which elaborates “the world, and maybe even the whole possibility of and desire for a world” as the “master’s tools” of Audre Lorde’s intervention,138 arms the black feminist argument with ammunition to forge a cosmology typified not by plentitude but by lack. This cosmology is grounded not by phallic signification but by a “perpetual and involuntary openness,” which—Sexton teaches us—is “the “paradigmatic condition of black existence in the modern world.”139 The notable difference between an Afro-pessimistic approach and a black feminist one, if any, is that Afro-pessimism accepts and leans into the paradigmatic structure of black antagonism, accepting the Historical alienation that typifies social death, it bears clarifying, not as a closed door to social life but as a portal into an/Other sociality—off the record. Without a name or referent, the “elsewhere and elsewhen” of black social life, which “sprouts out of the wet places in [our] eyes…the waiting places in [our] palms, [and] the tremble holding in [our mouths],”140 finds refuge in black femininity because (pace Spillers) the immateriality of gender in the black instance does not default the metaphysics of racial blackness to phallic masculinity but to invaginated femininity. Speaking to a different audience, Lewis Gordon explains that the racially black man as (pace Spillers) the personification “female flesh ungendered” is always already feminine. He writes,

The black man is caught. He cannot reject his femininity without simultaneously rejecting his blackness, for his femininity stands as a consequence of his blackness and vice versa. Standing in front of a white [human] wall, he appears as a hole, as a gaping, feminine symbol to be filled, closed up, by the being who has being.141

Doubly penetrable as hole—as the invaginated Other of Freud’s phallocentrism and the human-animal Other Fanon describes—the black (feminine) is a figure that awaits signification interminably. Powerless to “escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography,”142 the black (feminine) conjures Other ways of being and knowing that “can be felt and perceived even though—or especially if—[they] remain unrecognizable or unintelligible to our current common senses.”143 Excommunicated from the historical frame, the black (feminine) gives sanctuary to our freedom dreams. Hers is the safe harbor that guards black life from humanism’s thieving reach. And, as “the historical evocation of chaos”144—as (pace Fanon) an im/ possibility for time—the black (feminine) rages against the machine to disarticulate the “historical categories” that engender human be(com) ing in the first place.

In an exchange with Wilderson, Hartman summons the life and writings of Harriet A. Jacobs to claim the non-negotiable centrality of the black feminine as “the space of death, where negation is the captive’s central possibility for action.”145 Black femininity as a “content [that] exceeds […] expression”146—recall that the black (feminine) “[presents as] a virtual blank” and has no shape or meaning—models the social life of social death and is the harbinger of an occult Otherwise. That is to say, the black (feminine) is pregnant/impregnable with possibilities for a non-Historical becoming. She disarticulates the spatialization of time qua the racialization of time to “[interrupt] the habitual formation of bodies;”147 her #blackgirlmagic indexes an/Other time—a gestational time—to induce “chaos” for the record and the record-keeper alike. Following Annie Menzel’s reading of maternal generativity, the black feminine as the site of maternity—the black womb—invokes “unspeakable violence with insurgent horizon.”148 Not just void, the black feminine-cum-maternal engenders another space for living, not in-time but divested from time as the marker of forward-movement and teleological development. Hers is not the time of History (i.e., Man’s chronopolitical order), which Walter Benjamin describes as a “homogenous, empty time”149 that dialectically (re)produces “the ‘time of the now’”150 in/as the time of tomorrow—of futurity, or humanism. Rather, hers is an embryonic and gestational time, which like the slow and stalled time of captivity qua the oceanic is the insurgent and occult time of waiting/wading and wanting.151 While the birth canal, in Christina Sharpe’s pointed rendering, is a “domestic middle passage” that “[disfigures] black maternity, [turning] the womb into a factory (producing blackness as abjection much like the slave ship’s hold and the prison)” and demanding from the black mother the reproductive labor of chattel slavery—Sharpe explains that the birth canal “[ushers children] into her condition; her non-status, her non-being-ness”152—the black womb, as a container for gestation and not the vehicle for entry, specifically, as embryonic space-time suspends black life to nurture its emergent but not-yet-emerging Otherwise.

Taking inspiration from Spillers’ exhortation in “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe” (1987) to “make a place for” the black (feminine) as a “[non-Historical] social subject,” not to make room for her in “the ranks of gendered femaleness”—in humanism’s liberal folds—but to claim her “insurgent ground,”153 which Menzel describes as Spillers’ call for a “maternal temporality of continuous upheaval,”154 I submit, in closing, that the black feminine qua maternal, as Rizvana Bradley describes her, a “(w)holeness”155 that, as Toni Morrison memorably insists, “consistently [defies] classification,”156 is at once void (i.e., socially dead) and pregnant (i.e., with social life). She summons the revolution that we—all of us, black and nonblack persons (of color) alike—seek, not (just) as a salve for Trump’s violence but as the escape hatch we can use to flee the White/Master’s house, the violence of liberal humanism as the architect of chattel slavery and colonialism, and the container for human be(com)ing—History—that constrains our movements generally. To live in the space-time of the black womb’s oceanic is to be swallowed up by the infinite expanse of racial blackness. As the site of an/Other social, this embryonic space-time disarticulates Man’s chronopolitical order and is the “elsewhere and elsewhen” that we have been looking for, to date, in the wrong place—in the letter of the law of a civil society that operationalizes humanism’s race/ism. We might find our freedom instead in the black mother, who uses the resources she does not have to hold and to carry, indeed, to make life-generat-ing black poetry from the grammar of this wor(l)d’s insatiably violent antiblack prose.

#### Plan focus is a smokescreen. Vote negative to foreground scholarship that better articulates black suffering.

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The latter task – the trenchant interrogation of racial blackness and/in the formulations of modernity and its leitmotif of freedom – was advanced immeasurably by Professors Lindon Barrett, Denise Ferreira da Silva, and Ronald Judy, each in their own way. Yet, as Wilderson again makes plain in his Red, White, and Black (2009), the grand and anxious question of freedom is preceded, logically and ontologically, by a perhaps more confounding question: what does it mean to suffer? To address such a query sufficiently is to disregard the official impatience that envelopes it. Of course, this sentiment of expediency plays to an understandably popular urgency that emanates from the severity of everyday life for the vast majority of black people and the attendant status anxiety of the so-called new black middle class. However, black creative intellectuals have done less and less talking about our pain of late and probably a bit too much posturing about our plans. If anything, we have a surplus of plans! What we do not have is a language – much less a political culture – that adequately articulates both the variance and commonality of our positions and our predicaments. African American Studies is perhaps more inarticulate about the dimensions and details of black suffering today, in an era marked by transnationalism and multi-racialism, than it has been at any other historical juncture. I am speaking here of suffering in its fullest sense: not only as pain, which everyone experiences – say, the pain of alienation and exploitation – but also as that which blacks must bear, uniquely and singularly, that which we must stand and stand alone (see Sexton 2007).

The proposal and invitation continues:

The yield of this gathering will be to assemble leading scholars alongside emergent voices in the field of African American Studies in order to reflect critically upon the mutual implication of a proliferate and diverse racial formation with the living legacies of the black radical tradition in the age of American empire. The symposium seeks to depart from prevailing frameworks for comparative ethnic studies – that is, discerning how the respective experiences of blacks and other people of color are similar or dissimilar and what have been their historic interactions – to consider how the matrix of enslavement, which is to say the invention of “propertized human being” (Harris 1993), has not only shaped myriad forms of oppression and marginalization, but has compromised their modes of resistance and [their] claims to independence as well. If there is an overarching objective here, it is to properly illuminate what might be termed the obscurity of black suffering, to rescue it from the murky backwaters of persistent invisibility as well as the high-definition distortions of glaring and fascinated light.

Proper illumination is a catchy byline, an instance of wishful thinking, if ever there was one. But can we not speak of it more charitably, perhaps as a stratagem? Or as a spur that exercises the limits of our thinking?

In her ground-breaking Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman calls our attention to the ease with which scenes of spectacular violence against the black body – what she terms “inaugural moment[s] in the formation of the enslaved” – are reiterated in discourses both academic and popular, “the casualness,” she writes, “with which they are circulated, and the consequences of this routine display of the slave’s ravaged body”:

Rather than inciting indignation, too often they immure us to pain by virtue of their familiarity – the oft-repeated or restored character of these accounts and our distance from them are signaled by the theatrical language usually resorted to in describing these instances – and especially because they reinforce the spectacular character of black suffering. [. . .] At issue here is the precariousness of empathy and the uncertain line between witness and spectator. Only more obscene than the brutality unleashed at the whipping post is the demand that this suffering be materialized and evidenced by the display of the tortured body or endless recitations of the ghastly and terrible. In light of this, how does one give expression to these outrages without exacerbating the indifference to suffering that is the consequence of the benumbing spectacle or contend with narcissistic identification that obliterates the other or the prurience that too often is the response of such displays. (Hartman 1997: 4)

To put it bluntly, how does one engage with black suffering at all without simply erasing it – refusing it, absorbing it, appropriating it – in the very same gesture? Hartman’s inventive response to what might appear, at first glance, to be a rhetorical question or a cruel joke (that is, making a case with evidence that is, strictly speaking, inadmissible) is to move away from the expected “invocations of the shocking and the terrible” and to look, alternately, at “scenes in which terror can hardly be discerned,” “the terror of the mundane and quotidian,” what she phrases appositely as “the diffusion of terror.” What she finds, if calling it a “finding” is not immediately to betray it, is the recapitulation – the repetition and summation – of this spectacular primal scene across the entirety of the social text of racial slavery and its aftermath. That is to say, it is never the case that this terror is not present. It saturates the field of encounter. It is ubiquitous and yet it is, perhaps for the same reason, barely discernible. One wonders thus: how might the discussion of this dispersed, ambient terror become any more compelling than that which is condensed and acute? The point being not that blacks enter the wrong evidence or pursue the wrong argument, but rather that they are disallowed from entering evidence or building arguments in the first place, barred, as it were, from bringing charges and levying claims of grievance or injury as such. Again, what does it mean to suffer, in this way? This “challenge,” as Hartman modestly calls it, of giving expression to the inexpressible is taken up again in Fred Moten’s remarkable text, In the Break. In fact, it is the discrepancy between subjection and objection that launches the accomplishment of a project opened and closed around the impossibility and the inevitability of “the resistance of the object” (Moten 2003: 1). That, at least, is how it sounds to me. What is disquieting and provocative in this exchange is what I take to be a certain turning away from the implications of Hartman’s precarious distinction between witness and spectator, a positional instability that is not mitigated by transpositions in the sonic register, nor, for that matter, in the performance arts more generally (Barrett 1999; Weheliye 2005).

## ADVANTAGE 1

### 1NC

#### R&D and immigration shortages thump innovation.

Vaswani 20, Asia business correspondent. (Karishma, 9-11-2020, "Ex-Google boss: US 'dropped the ball' on innovation", *BBC News*, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54100001)

In the battle for tech supremacy between the US and China, America has "dropped the ball" in funding for basic research, according to former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt. And that's one of the key reasons why China has been able to catch up. Dr Schmidt, who is currently the Chairman of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, said he thinks the US is still ahead of China in tech innovation, for now. But that the gap is narrowing fast. "There's a real focus in China around invention and new AI techniques," he told the BBC's Talking Business Asia programme. "In the race for publishing papers China has now caught up." China displaced the US as the world's top research publisher in science and engineering in 2018, according to data from the World Economic Forum. That's significant because it shows how much China is focusing on research and development in comparison to the US.For example, Chinese telecoms infrastructure giant Huawei spends as much as $20bn (£15.6bn) on research and development - one of the highest budgets in the world. Dr Schmidt blames the narrowing of the innovation gap between the US and China on the lack of funding in the US. "For my whole life, the US has been the unquestioned leader of R&D," the former Google boss said. "Funding was the equivalent of 2% or so of GDP of the country. Recently R&D has fallen to a lower percentage number than was there before Sputnik." According to Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a US research institute, the US government now invests less in R&D compared to the size of the economy than it has in more than 60 years. This has resulted in "stagnant productivity growth, lagging competitiveness and reduced innovation". Dr Schmidt also said the US's tech supremacy has been built on the back of the international talent that's been allowed to work and study in the US - and warns the US risks falling further behind if this kind of talent isn't allowed into the country. Tech war "This high skills immigration is crucial to American competitiveness, global competitiveness, building these new companies and so forth," he said. "America does not have enough people with those skills." The US has been embroiled in a tech cold war with China and in recent months has stepped up its anti-China rhetoric. This week it revoked the visas of 1,000 Chinese students it claims have military links and accused Chinese tech firms of acting as agents for the Chinese Communist Party - claims Beijing and these companies reject. The Trump administration has also taken steps to block Chinese tech firms like Huawei and Chinese apps including TikTok and WeChat, saying they pose threats to national security. Beijing has said this is "naked bullying", and Dr Schmidt says the bans will mean China will be even more likely to invest in its own domestic manufacturing. Dr Schmidt says the right strategy for a US-China relationship is what is called a 'rivalry partnership' where the US needs to be able to "collaborate with China, while also competing with them". "When we're rivals, we are rough, we are pursuing things. We're competing hard, we're trying to get advantage - real competition - which the US can do well, and which China can do well. But there's also plenty of areas where we need to be partners."

#### North Korean threat imagery is racist fodder for imperialism.

Prerna Lal 9, JD from George Washington University and MA in International Relations from San Franscisco State University, “North Korea Is Not a Threat – Unveiling Hegemonic Discourses”, 4/5/2009, http://prernalal.com/2009/04/ north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/

That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, “create” each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. -Ronnie Lipschutz, UCSC Kim Jong-Il wants attention. And now he has it. He won’t go in our ‘Morons of the Week’ column and certainly scores points for knowing how to misuse national resources to get international attention. Our problem with MSM coverage of the North Korea ‘missile threat’ is with the purported hegemonic discourse. Hegemonic discourse does not pertain to just speech; it refers to whole narratives, with a hero and a villain, and us and them that we must defeat and overcome. The point of hegemonic discourse–in this case the discourse of the United States on demonizing North Korea and drawing attention to its nuclear activities—is to subjugate and oppress the counter-discourses of a race-war, nuclearism and anti-capitalism. (1) Race war discourse While this is not a clash of civilizations, it is certainly a race war in that the entire discourse revolves around preventing certain kinds of people from acquiring and using nuclear weapons.  Would the United States use the same tactics in France? Or even India? No, in fact it looked the other way on outrageous French nuclear testing in the Pacific and supports India’s nuclear program despite the fact that it is not a signatory of the NPT! Ronnie Lipschutz has some fine lines for us in On Security: To be sure, the United States and Russia do not launch missiles against each other because both know the result would be annihilation. But the same is true for France and Britain, or China and Israel. It was the existence of the Other that gave deterrence its power; it is the disappearance of the Other that has vanquished that power. Where Russia is now concerned, we are, paradoxically, not secure, because we see no need to be secured. In other words, as Ole Waever might put it, where there is no constructed threat, there is no security problem. France is fully capable of doing great damage to the United States, but that capability has no meaning in terms of U.S. security. On the other hand, see the Iran nuclear ‘crisis’ as an example. The United States has demonized Ahmadinejad at every opportunity and conjured him up as an Islamic fundamentalist and nationalist who will defy non-proliferation at all costs. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad cheekily asked the United States to join the rest of civilization in worshipping God. That is the discourse of race war but it is concealed by juridical discourse—the hegemonic discourse. To borrow from Michael Foucault, the United States is using the juridical schema of nuclear non-proliferation to conceal the war-repression schema. North Korea is the historical Other, the terrorist, the threat against whom the world must be protected in the juridical schema. Yet, under the war-repression schema, North Korea is a sovereign nation with the right to develop nuclear and communications technology. And this latest action is really nothing more than a plea for economic help. (2) Nuclearism discourse Tied to the race war schema, is the discourse of nuclearism, which refers to the ideology that nuclear weapons are instruments of peace. Nukespeak in the form of MAD or the hype over so-called precision weapons by our leaders has had trickle-down effects to the point of achieving a mental-wipe or historical amnesia of the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This discourse effectively represents a war on history and subjugation of knowledges about the horrors of nuclear war and fallout. Closely related to nuclearism is the issue of whiteness around nuclear weapons, the paternalistic presupposition that Western powers are the responsible and rightful leaders on the issue, the racist ideology that nuclear weapons in the hands of an Islamic country or “terrorist” spells end to world peace or catastrophe while it is perfectly alright for France, Britain, the United States, Russia, China and now India, to have nuclear weapons. The epistemological assumptions of nuclearism are dangerous, besides being racist and morally repulsive. The formation of a “nuclear club” and an exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons makes them a forbidden fruit and an issue of prestige, thereby encouraging proliferation. Indeed, discourse around the North Korea and Iran nuclear buildup denotes that these countries see a successful completion of the fuel cycle or the launching of a rocket as an issue of great prestige. There is absolutely nothing prestigious about owning weapons of mass destruction, weapons that can end civilization. However, countries like North Korea and Iran can be forgiven for their nuclearist mentality; after all, it is an implication of the discourse that has been perpetuated by the West, a discourse that has become common knowledge and culture. Nuclearism must be addressed and put on the table to move past the current impasse over nuclear negotiations and the non-proliferation regime. Without denouncing nuclear weapons and facing our moral conscience as the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons, we cannot hope to avert nuclear proliferation and prevent ‘rogue states’ from going that route. (3) Anti-Capitalism Discourse Truth be told, much of the world is suffering from the dire effects of an international economic system that does not benefit them. All the signs of desperation are present. They come from the [rallies](http://www.prisonplanet.com/mass-protest-in-rome-over-financial-crisis.html) andburning of effigies around the world. The violent protests against [NATO and the G-20 summit](http://www.democracynow.org/2009/4/2/after_g20_mass_protests_await_obama). [The high prices of food](http://www.javno.com/en-world/high-food-prices-add-to-violence-in-war-zones_151721). They come as [small requests from students](http://www.nowpublic.com/world/anybody-listening-president-obama-has-and-now-so-should-you) on whether anyone is listening. And even the [scapegoating of the Other](http://www.entangledstates.org/2009/04/stop-scapegoating-the-other.html) (be it gays, Muslims, liberals, undocumented immigrants) is really an ignorant response to our unwanted troubles, thoughts and desires. The problem is not North Korea or Kim Jung II. The problem is an international system of haves and have-nots, where people without institutional power vie for attention. In this scenario, a nuclear missile from an impoverished, wretched country helps garner more attention than protests, rallies and suicide. How else can North Korea hope to get the help that it desperately needs? [Foolcracy](http://foolocracy.com/2009/04/north-korea-launches-its-missileand-theres-not-much-anyone-can-do-about-it/) is hits the nail on what might happen next: What else of those “consequences” besides the expected veto of proposed UN sanctions? It probably means that a deal will be made with North Korea for food and other essentials. In return, North Korea will “give up” part of its nuclear or rocket program and…then, in a couple of years, they will go back to the same game of spitting in the face of the world in exchange for food and other essentials. In other words, its a bit like a dysfunctional family that likes to play with guns. The Obama Administration has scrambled to battle anti-Americanism with new euphemisms. It is not the ‘global war on terror’ but a ‘[global contingency operation](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/03/AR2009040303589.html).’ Not likely to catch on anytime soon. The people living in dire states and conditions, ravaged by war, poverty and hardship, know precisely what it is–an attack on their existence predicated by the United States and its allies. We have seen and read the master narrative before of demonizing a country, bringing about regime change and killing, colonizing and repressing more peoples while doing it. By unearthing these counter-discourses, we can hope to move towards a ‘solution’ to the North Korea issue. Again, the ‘problem-solution’ is not the missiles, but the manner in which North Korea is seeking help and attention. Finding common ground requires discovering and deconstructing the cultural and discursive constructs. However, the window of opportunity is quite small, as seen by positions and interests of the parties involved. I don’t doubt though, that North Korea will cease to be an entity sometime in the near future and become into Korea again.

#### The current economic sanctions regime is directly responsible for mass famine. The impact parallels nuclear war.

Levkowitz and Shauli, 19 (\*Dr. Alon Levkowitz, a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is an expert on East Asian security, the Korean Peninsula, and Asian international organizations. \*\*Dr. Ran Shauli is a research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He also teaches Southeast Asian History with a focus on Genocide, Diasporic Memory, and Agriculture at Bar-Ilan University and the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya.; 8-28-2019; “The Cost of Sanctions on North Korea”; Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies; https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/cost-sanctions-north-korea/)

Sanctions are perceived by the public in the sanctioning states – and are portrayed by policymakers in those countries – as a surgical, non-lethal, and even morally superior mechanism that increases discomfort but does no real harm.

The effectiveness of sanctions has been debated, but their humanitarian cost to the citizens of the targeted state is only rarely acknowledged. The logic underlying them is fundamentally flawed.

The states doing the sanctioning are generally democratic, whereas the affected states usually are not. The underlying assumption – that subjects of non-democratic or even outright totalitarian regimes will use agency they do not possess to force their leaders to change their ways – is almost never challenged. In non-democratic states, leaders are often willing to sacrifice the people to continue their rule. The North Korean regime has proved beyond any doubt that it subscribes to this practice: It provided food for the army and to members of the political elite at the direct expense of common people, whose food quotas were accordingly cut back.

Information assembled by agencies such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization shows a clear correlation between the dates when sanctions were implemented (2003) and the prevalence of severe malnourishment in North Korea. A decade of hunger and semi-hunger has resulted in the deaths of more than half a million North Koreans. Today, in 2019, due to the combined effects of sanctions, the weather, and the failed management of the criminal regime, North Korea faces another hunger crisis that could lead to the deaths of many thousands more if some of the sanctions are not lifted immediately.

Alleviating the sanctions would not solve the problem, but it would prevent many deaths in the short run. In the long run, Pyongyang will need to change its economic and agricultural policy in order to prevent the next food crisis. Such reforms would force the regime to ease its control over some sectors of the economy, and to allow the acceptance and distribution of aid from foreign states or international NGOs. Such a situation would weaken the North Korean regime, which boasts a supposed “self-reliance” system – despite the fact that it is dependent on foreign states, like China, for its very survival.

Western policymakers, as well as the general public, should be aware that sanctions take a toll on people’s lives in numbers that are often equivalent to casualties caused by weapons of mass destruction. Policymakers in countries that initiate sanctions on non-democratic states, such as North Korea, should consider that they can have widespread lethal effects on the citizens of those states. They should instead consider sanctions that will target the political and military elite.

The debate over sanctions on non-democratic states, whose leaders are not affected by polls, should not be limited to the political arena. The cost of sanctions – the potential to cause the deaths of large numbers of people – should be discussed more often in both the academic and the public spheres, even when the states being sanctioned are defined by the West as rogue states.

#### No North Korean war

Grady 9-11-2020, former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News (John Grady, “U.S. Forces Korea CO: North Korea Showing No Signs of Regime Instability” <https://news.usni.org/2020/09/11/u-s-forces-korea-co-north-korea-showing-no-signs-of-regime-instability>)

North Korea is not showing any signs of lashing out against South Korea or Japan or launching a deliberate provocation as the American presidential election nears, the senior commander on the peninsula said Thursday. Army Gen. Robert Abrams, speaking in a Center for Strategic and International Studies online forum, said “we’re not seeing any sign of regime instability” as North Korea confronts the threat of COVID-19 that sharply curtailed its trade with China, recovers from three typhoons this year and remains under severe U.N. economic sanctions. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s regime “is focused on getting their country back together.” Abrams, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, said as harsh as conditions are now, they do not compare to the widespread famine that Kim’s father faced in the mid-1990s. Along the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, “the reduction in tensions is palpable” from earlier this year. Abrams remained hopeful that some type of negotiations over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs could resume between the North and South or between the United States and North Korea.

#### Sanctions fail.

Kusa 20, Kyiv-based author and analyst of international relations with the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. (Iliya, 8-13-2020, "Sanctions Against Russia: Rethinking the West’s Approach", *Wilson Center*, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/sanctions-against-russia-rethinking-wests-approach)

However, there are several major drawbacks to the Western sanctions against Russia. First, the sanctions are not complex. Often they don’t cover the whole targeted sector, and consequently their impact is partial. For example, restrictions imposed against Russian rocket fuel do not include some types of chemicals that could be used to produce this fuel.

Second, some sanctions have already become ineffectual. For instance, since 2014 the Russian government has found multiple ways to circumvent European and US sanctions imposed because of the annexation of Crimea. These sanctions have not been changed or updated in six years. Moreover, part of the Crimean sanctions package was dormant from the very beginning. Sanctions might have worked had Russia had tried to develop a civilian economy on the peninsula, which it did not.

Third, the political aspect, especially its European dimension, creates additional obstacles to preserving the sanctions regime and therefore deterring Russia. EU sanctions were introduced after a series of multilayered, complex negotiations involving the EU’s twenty-eight member states and their respective governments. With each passing year, enthusiasm for sanctions among the European states wanes under pressure from the industrial lobby, business communities, and traders, making it less and less possible to preserve the EU’s sanctions in their original form.

As a result of these drawbacks, Russia appears to have suffered only minimally economically, successfully overcoming the initial shock from sanctions. Russia’s GDP grew from 0.3 percent in 2016 to 2.3 percent in 2018, and the structure of Russia-EU trade hasn’t changed dramatically, with trade in some sectors and markets even growing through the years. Of the sanctions-imposing states, Germany has benefited the most from continuing trade with Russia.

#### Delay and firm regrowth undermine solvency.

Fukuyama et al. 21, \*Francis, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. \*\*Barak Richman, Katharine T. Bartlett Professor of Law and Professor of Business Administration at Duke University School of Law. \*\*\*Ashish Goel, Professor of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. They are members of the Working Group on Platform Scale for Stanford University’s Program on Democracy and the Internet. (January/February 2021, "How to Save Democracy From Technology", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-24/fukuyama-how-save-democracy-technology)

Another approach to checking Internet platforms’ power is to promote greater competition. If there were a multiplicity of platforms, none would have the dominance enjoyed by Facebook and Google today. The problem, however, is that neither the United States nor the EU could likely break up Facebook or Google the way that Standard Oil and AT&T were broken up. Today’s technology companies would fiercely resist such an attempt, and even if they eventually lost, the process of breaking them up would take years, if not decades, to complete. Perhaps more important, it is not clear that breaking up Facebook, for example, would solve the underlying problem. There is a very good chance that a baby Facebook created by such a breakup would quickly grow to replace the parent. Even AT&T regained its dominance after being broken up in the 1980s. Social media’s rapid scalability would make that happen even faster.

#### Courts circumvent.

Newman 19, University of Miami School of Law professor and a former attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. (John, 4-5-2019, "What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust", *Atlantic*, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-2020-democratic-candidates-miss-about-antitrust/586135/)

But the federal courts represent a massive stumbling block for any progressive antitrust movement. Reformers have identified two paths forward; both lead eventually to the court system. The first is relatively moderate: appoint regulators who will actually enforce the laws already on the books. Warren’s plan rests in part on this straightforward idea. The second, more audacious path requires congressional action to amend and strengthen our current laws. Warren’s call for a new ban on technology companies’ buying and selling via their own platforms falls into this category. Klobuchar has also proposed new antitrust legislation that would make it easier to block harmful mergers and acquisitions. But no matter its content, enforcing a law requires persuading a judge. When it comes to U.S. antitrust laws, federal judges—not Congress, and not regulatory agencies—are the ultimate arbiters. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division, one of our two public enforcement agencies, files all its cases in federal courts. And although the Federal Trade Commission (the other) can decide cases internally, the inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well. No matter how strongly worded a law may be, ideologically driven judges can usually find a way around enforcing it. The cyclical history of U.S. antitrust law is proof that judges wield nearly limitless institutional power in this area. Soon after Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, a conservative Supreme Court began to chip away at its effectiveness. Congress reacted in 1914 with the Clayton Act, which sought to ban anticompetitive mergers. In 1936, at the height of the New Deal era, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price discrimination (charging different prices to different buyers for the same product). These laws were actively enforced for decades. But starting in the late 1970s, conservative judges began to erode the Clayton Act. Today, megamergers among competitors such as Bayer and Monsanto barely raise eyebrows. So-called vertical mergers, which combine suppliers and their customers, are now all but immune from antitrust enforcement—see the DOJ’s failed challenge to AT&T and Time Warner’s recent tie-up. Under the business-friendly Roberts Court, the Robinson-Patman Act has similarly been eviscerated. By the 2000s, the ideas of the conservative Chicago School had become mainstream in antitrust circles. Robinson-Patman, a law intended to protect small businesses, was an easy target for Chicago School critics narrowly focused on efficiency and low consumer prices. Their attacks found a receptive audience in the federal judiciary. Among insiders, Robinson-Patman is now known as “zombie law.” It remains on the books, but regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it. If Democrats want to change antitrust law, they will first and foremost need to change the judges who apply it. Yet none of the 2020 contenders championing antitrust reform have even mentioned the possibility of appointing progressive antitrust thinkers to the bench. Conservatives, on the other hand, have long recognized the centrality of antitrust to broader questions about the apportionment of power in society. In his seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork called antitrust a “microcosm in which larger movements of our society are reflected.” Battles fought in this arena, Bork wrote, “are likely to affect the outcome of parallel struggles in others.” Strong antitrust enforcement keeps powerful monopolies in check. Toothless antitrust allows the unlimited accumulation of corporate power. Recognizing the high stakes, the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts to the federal judiciary. Bork was an antitrust professor at Yale Law School before becoming an appellate judge in 1982.\* Frank Easterbrook practiced and taught antitrust before donning the black robe in 1985. Douglas Ginsburg served as the head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division before he became a federal judge in 1986. None of the three managed to join the Supreme Court, but not for lack of trying. Reagan nominated both Bork and Ginsburg to serve as justices, though Ginsburg withdrew and Bork was famously rejected after a contentious Senate hearing. And whom did the GOP select as its very first U.S. Supreme Court nominee during the Trump Administration? None other than Neil Gorsuch, who practiced antitrust law for more than a decade before joining the Tenth Circuit. Even as a judge, Gorsuch continued to teach a law-school course on antitrust until his confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2017. Once upon a time, progressives demonstrated similar concern about judicial treatment of antitrust laws. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, served as special assistant to the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division before his judicial appointment by President Jimmy Carter. Earlier still, Justice John Paul Stevens was an antitrust lawyer, scholar, and professor before his appointment to the bench. Today’s Democratic 2020 hopefuls seem to have forgotten the lessons of history. Their antitrust proposals focus exclusively on appointing the right regulators and amending our current statutes. These are right-minded ideas, but they overlook the central role judges play in our political system. There is an old saying in the legal community: “Hard cases make bad law.” That may be true, but it is just as often the case that bad judges make bad law. Real antitrust reform will require more than regulatory and legislative tweaks; it will require the right judges.

## ADVANTAGE 2

### 1NC

#### Emerging tech won’t tip the balance of power.

Gilli 19, Senior Researcher in the Research Division, NDC. (Andrea, Feb. 2019, “Preparing for ‘NATO-mation’: the Atlantic Alliance toward the age of artificial intelligence”, *NDC Policy Brief*, No. 4, pg. 3, Accessible at: http://nato-70.upt.pt/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Preparing\_NATO\_mation.pdf)

Military transformation and emerging technologies

A second, and related, issue is the risk that, in the age of intelligent machines, AI, ML and BD may easily enable any actor to catch up, or even outpace, its adversaries in military terms. Here too, skepticism is warranted. First of all, these two concerns logically contradict each other. If we are witnessing a military transformation based on dual-use, general-purpose technologies such as AI, ML and BD that can be easily exploited in battle, then no actor can achieve a significantly enduring military advantage – at the tactical, operational or strategic level – as competitors can quickly catch up or deploy effective counter-systems.8

Next, military power is more than hardware. Tactical fluency and operational competence are in fact extremely important for victory on the battlefield – along with other variables. There is no reason to believe that this will change anytime soon, as warfare, war and by extension strategy are inherently adversarial: winners succeed because they defeat their adversaries – i.e., they neutralize enemy counter-measures, tactics, systems and innovations. Possessing capable hardware is thus, per se, not sufficient and, at times, not even necessary for winning. Commercial technologies offer great potential but are easily vulnerable to even basic counter-measures as they are not designed for combat.

By the same token, emerging technologies – whether developed for commercial or military applications – face performance trade-offs that constrain their immediate military utility. The French Marine Nationale’s mid-19th century bid to offset British naval superiority is telling: the steam engine granted independence from wind but suffered from limited endurance; iron hulls could not keep afloat when hit; and, explosive shells had shorter ranges than solid shots. When mature, these technologies ultimately transformed naval warfare, but it took almost a century for this to happen.9

There is no reason to believe that with AI, ML and BD things will be different. When it comes to software, in fact, even subtle and apparently minor details lead to catastrophic failure: because of simple mistakes in data gathering or processing such as automatic path control, military platforms may end up exceeding their maximum depth or altitude ceilings and thus expose themselves to almost certain mission failure. Software already represents the primary source of procurement delays and cost overruns. As software becomes more central in weapon systems, the problems it creates can only exponentially increase. Additionally, through generative adversarial networks (GNAs), actors can increasingly feed compromised data into enemy systems to negatively affect tactical performance or operational success. Competent armed forces will thus deploy intelligent machines only in so far as the risks, problems and constraints they face are, slowly and progressively, addressed.

This brings us to a final consideration. In order to address these very risks, problems and constraints, investments in a broad range of fields are also needed so as to counterbalance investments by enemies and adversaries. Improving all the underlying technologies related to AI, ML and BD, learning about their potential, integrating them into existing military platforms and exploiting them for maximum strategic, operational or tactical effectiveness require time, human capital, institutional backing, technological competence and financial resources. In other words, the idea that countries can quickly exploit the technologies of the fourth Industrial Revolution for building military power seems exaggerated.10

#### **No US-China war.**

Lei 20, PhD and MA in International Politics, associate research fellow with the China Institute of International Studies. (Cui, 7-24-2020, "Despite heated talk, risk of a US-China hot war is small", *South China Morning Post*, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3094121/why-risk-us-china-hot-war-small-despite-heated-talk)

Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war

#### [marked]

to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

# 2NC

## K

### 2NC---AT Extinction

#### 3---white futurity---extinction’s non-unique, placing it in the future smooths over the ongoing Black apocalypse that coheres Anthropocene ethics.

Karera 19, assistant professor of philosophy and African American studies @ Wesleyan University. (Axelle, “Blackness and the Pitfalls of Anthropocene Ethics”, *Critical Philosophy of Race*, Volume 7, Issue 1, pg. 43-46)

In all their shocking glory, Summers’s remarks epitomize a pervading instrumentalization of black existence, which challenges much of the totalizing gestures of Anthropocene narratives. It is the logic intrinsic to these gestures that I have attempted to lay out thus far. Braidotti, Morton, Tuana, and even Colebrook in her incisive interventions, are unable to relinquish or effectively resist the homogenizing consequences of the discourse.42 Their respective ethical and critical prescriptions sidestep an engaged account of social antagonisms, and more specifically those enacted along racial lines. Instead, these are smoothed over and displaced in the name of an ethics of futurity grounded on a deeply naturalized variation of relationality—namely that all beings, insofar as they are earthly at least, are fundamentally interconnected and can (or must) only be perceived as such. This affirmation, as well as Braidotti’s own brand of vitalism, is not only symptomatic of a more entrenched form of historical amnesia concerning questions of culpability (i.e., how did we end up here and who is responsible). More perniciously, they appear to be yet another instantiation of Saidiya Hartman’s provocative claim that “the white bourgeois family can actually live with murder in order to reconstitute its domesticity.”43 In its most blatant form, Summers’s secret memo is precisely this! There is nothing sacrificial in his proposition; it is not about preserving the air quality that matters—so to speak—at the expense of Africans. Rather, Africa—and therefore blackness—remains the disposable trash container of the world par excellence; a case of instrumentalization in its most primitive execution. Under these conditions, one is thus pressed to inquire how can a global ethics of care44 be possible when fundamental questions of racial culpability are eluded in the name of a shortsighted conception of “becoming” and an aggrandized notion of ontological relationality—both of which remain unwilling to sustain engagements with their violent racial foundations. Indeed, in her critical essay evocatively titled “The Mattering of Black Lives: Octavia Butler’s Hyperempathy and the Promise of the New Materialism,” Diana Leong asserts that the “reduction and disavowal of race [. . .] is something of a structural necessity for the new materialisms.”45 In ways that significantly resonate with my own argument in this article, she contends that, in addition to being a discursive necessity, circumventing the race question in this discourse “enables an ethics of relation or affect that further legitimizes the reduction and dismissal of race.”46 In other words, as I have also maintained, the ontological realism that naturalizes this “hyper-ethics” of relationality can only be maintained by the concealment of systems of racial oppression.

Recall that the ethical dimension of Braidotti’s becoming-posthumanist strives for the actualization of a community-to-come unrestrained by “the guilt of ancestral communal violence, or the melancholia of unpayable ontological debts.”47 This suggests that posthumanist reconfigurations of subjectivity and its creative invention of a “future people” as solutions to our ecological demise, hinge on the forgetting of the atrocious making of “another people” by slavery and the responsibility such violent history bestows on the Western world. What remains at stake here, however, is not so much the general (and generic) recognition of the differential effects of our environmental crisis on vulnerable populations. The literature exists, and the work continues to be done.48 Rather, we must return to the structural conditions that facilitates and renders possible the “symptomatic desire to abandon race.”49

If indeed, as Leong forcefully argues, “Blackness [. . .] is the specter that haunts the Anthropocene and its possible futures,” it is imperative that we incisively revisit the conditions that make “blackened” life and death unregisterable and therefore un-grievable. And if indeed grievability and the imperative to survive constitute, as Colebrook suggests, the “we” of the Anthropocene, it behooves us to attend to those ungrievable lives for which even survival requires facing death. That is to say, those lives for which existence requires suicidal decisions such as deadly expeditions across the Mediterranean Sea, the Mexico-United States border, and the many “border-fortresses” of the EU. How can we possibly ascertain to possess an “adequate cartography of our real-life conditions,” when we continue to sidestep considering the precarity of “social practices of human embodiment,” which necessitate one to gamble with one’s own death in order to envisage the possibility of a future?50

Insofar as Tuana’s viscous porosity, Morton’s hyperobject, and Braidotti’s vitalist posthuman politics are mostly interested in giving an account of the ontological foundation of species entanglements, they cannot account for the violent foundational structures that make Summers’s indifference I mention above possible. In my opinion, this is the discursive gift that philosophical interventions in the study of anti-black racism have offered us in the past couple of decades, namely (and I quote Jared Sexton here): “A meditation on a poetics and politics of abjection wherein racial blackness operates as an asymptomtic approximation of that which disturbs every claim or formation of identity and difference as such.51 Unlike Braidotti, whose main concern is to reconfigure the boundaries of subjectivity so as to recompose, with a materialist politics of posthuman difference, a “missing people,” critical black philosophies interrogate the very foundation of becoming—of this “we” to come. In addition to its demystifying agenda, which unremittingly unsettles the self-aggrandizing gestures of Western theory, critical black philosophies consider black suffering to be a crucial site of interrogation. They question what it means to inhabit a structural position whereby by the black philosopher is always already forced to align herself with exclusionary terms in order to register antiblack violence as violence. They investigate, for instance, what using the general lexicon and terms of philosophy “insubordinately” entail for the black philosopher. What matters for this critical tradition is to assess the conditions of a world when blackness is, at last, understood to be a decisive organizing principle.

In his poignant essay “Onticide: Afro-Pessimism, Gay Nigger #1, and Surplus Violence,” Calvin Warren challenges us to think of those who fall “outside the cultural space of ethics, relationality, and the sacred.”52 In fact, he provides us with robust grounds to remain suspicious of the hasty impulses of an affirmative politics of life and relationality profoundly unequipped to recognize the mundane and persistent ways in which death and perhaps even extinction always already constitute existence for the “fungible” object/being. In this text, Warren returns to the brutal killing of Steen Keith Fenrich by his white stepfather. It is not the gruesome details surrounding Fenrich’s death that are at stake here; in the same ways the morbidly grandiose performances of anti-black violence across the globe do not necessarily hold explanatory power in and of themselves. Rather, Warren uses this story to show how the violent spectacularity of Fenrich’s death—its operation, protocols and structure - “indicate a certain ontological violation that preconditions physical injury.”53 This violence that shocks both in the simultaneity of its excessive gratuitousness and indiscriminate indifference, a violence that “exceeds the logics of utility,” to use Warren’s language, is indispensable for the constitution of the human self and necessary to maintain the coherence of its solipsistic contours and concomitant socio-political institutions.54

### 2NC---AT Agency

#### “Yes social life” is not an argument

Sexton 12, Professor of African American Studies and Film and Media Studies at the University of California, Irvine. (Jared, “Ante-Anti-Blackness: Afterthoughts”, *Lateral*, https://csalateral.org/issue/1/ante-anti-blackness-afterthoughts-sexton/)

Elsewhere, in a discussion of W. E. B. Du Bois on the study of black folk, Gordon restates an existential phenomenological conception of the anti-black world developed across his first several books: “Blacks here suffer the phobogenic reality posed by the spirit of racial seriousness. In effect, they more than symbolize or signify various social pathologies – they become them. In our anti-black world, blacks are pathology.”46 This conception would seem to support to Moten’s contention that even much radical black studies scholarship sustains the association of blackness with a certain sense of decay and thereby fortifies and extends the interlocutory life of widely accepted political common sense. In fact, it would seem that Gordon deepens the already problematic association to the level of identity. And yet, this is precisely what Gordon argues is the value and insight of Fanon: he fully accepts the definition of himself as pathological as it is imposed by a world that knows itself through that imposition, rather than remaining in a reactive stance that insists on the heterogeneity between a self and an imago originating in culture. Though it may appear counter-intuitive, or rather because it is counter-intuitive, this acceptance or affirmation is active; it is a willing or willingness, in other words, to pay whatever social costs accrue to being black, to inhabiting blackness, to living a black social life under the shadow of social death. This is not an accommodation to the dictates of the anti-black world. The affirmation of blackness, which is to say an affirmation of pathological being, is a refusal to distance oneself from blackness in a valorization of minor differences that bring one closer to health, life, or sociality. Fanon writes in the first chapter of  Black Skin, White Masks: “A Senegalese who learns Creole to pass for Antillean is a case of alienation. The Antilleans who make a mockery out of him are lacking in judgment.”47 In a world structured by the twin axioms of white superiority and black inferiority, of white existence and black non-existence, a world structured by a negative categorical imperative—”above all, don’t be black”48—in this world, the zero degree of transformation is the turn toward blackness, a turn toward the shame, as it were, that “resides in the idea that ‘I am thought of as less than human'”49 resides in the idea that ‘I am thought of as less than human’. And yet, the very shame that floods through at that thought, a shame that, were we not human, we would have no capacity to feel, is our best internal evidence that the thought is wrong and vulgar: I feel (shame), therefore I am (human). Acknowledging the permanence of our shame, and its usefulness, may mark the beginning… [of a response to the call] to ‘begin enjoying the humor’ again. The point may not be to become individual and modern, to ever achieve a kind of prophylactic invulnerability to the [discourse] that says ‘Shame on you! Shame on you for being black!’ We do not, at this late date, need yet newer formulations of pride to negate this shame. The point may be to locate, within the transformations of our shame, a way out of scapegoating, and thus, out of the bloodletting that accompanies with such monotonous reliability our attempts to regain our innocence” (389).] In this we might create a transvaluation of pathology itself, something like an embrace of pathology without pathos.  To speak of black social life  and  black social death, black social life  against  black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement, an agreement that takes shape in (between)  meconnaissance  and (dis)belief. Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by vitalizing it.

A living death is a much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system.50  Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. This is agreed. That is to say, what Moten asserts against afro-pessimism is a point already affirmed by afro-pessimism, is, in fact, one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely, that black life is not social, or rather that black life is  lived  in social  death. Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.

Wilderson’s is an analysis of the law in its operation as “police power and racial prerogative both under and after slavery.”51 So too is Moten’s analysis, at least that just-less-than-half of the intellectual labor committed to the object of black studies as critique of (the anti-blackness of) Western civilization. But Moten is just that much more interested in how black social life steals away or escapes from the law, how it frustrates the police power and, in so doing, calls that very policing into being in the first place. The policing of black freedom, then, is aimed less at its dreaded prospect, apocalyptic rhetoric notwithstanding, than at its irreducible precedence. The logical and ontological priority of the unorthodox self-predicating activity of blackness, the “improvisatory exteriority” or “improvisational immanence” that blackness is, renders the law dependent upon what it polices. This is not the noble agency of resistance. It is a reticence or reluctance that we might not know if it were not pushing back, so long as we know that this pushing back is really a pushing forward. So, in this perverse sense, black social death is black social life. The object of black studies is the aim of black studies. The most radical negation of the anti-black world is the most radical affirmation of a blackened world. Afro-pessimism is “not but nothing other than” black optimism.52, 53

### 2NC---AT Statistics/Data

#### NEW link---weaponizing empirics as “proof” of progress is an arbitrary double standard that stems from a presumption of distrust toward Black lived experience.

Lanius 15, PhD student in the Department of Communication and Media at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. (Candice, 1-12-2015, "Fact Check: Your Demand for Statistical Proof is Racist", *Cyberology*, https://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2015/01/12/fact-check-your-demand-for-statistical-proof-is-racist/)

That is because statistics are a method which require constant choices from the analyst, choices that are ideologically charged. There are a range of mathematically appropriate choices that are selected or overlooked according to the person constructing them. A basic example of this is the use of measures of central tendency: the mean, median, and mode all offer a summary position of the midpoint of a dataset, but depending on the context, one will be better than the others at offering clarity to a situation. This clarity is, of course, always a simplification, skimming the surface of situations. When complexity is erased, the surface is inscribed with the analyst’s view of the world and their beliefs about what is plausible. None of the measures of central tendency are “wrong” either mathematically or realistically, yet they are couched in a discourse of objectivity and reliability, and that makes them a dangerous technology.

Using statistics to talk about racialized police aggression accepts that the truth cannot be found among its victims. This is not to say that the ideological potential hidden within statistical analysis is all “bad”. Statistics were first used as a tool of the state and the ruling elite, yet that does not mean that statistics cannot be used to further a liberatory cause. Their power can move across and through hierarchical power structures (e.g power is circular), and it limits the actions of elites as well as less fortunate people. For an excellent essay on this topic, read Ian Hacking’s (1980) piece “How should we do the history of statistics?”

The demand for statistical proof started as a response to urbanization in 18th century Europe; it was suddenly possible for two individuals living in large cities to never meet or share similar experiences. Theodore Porter in his 1995 book Trust in Numbers explores the history of quantification and statistics in European and American public life. By looking at a diversity of governmental forms (monarchy, democracy, and autocracy) and various academic disciplines (actuarial sciences, political economy, and social engineering), Porter uncovers a common process whereby statistics are adopted as part of “strategies of communication”. Quantification is a “technology of trust” that creates a common language that connects different professions, disciplines, and communities.

Perhaps statistics should be considered a technology of mistrust—statistics are used when personal experience is in doubt because the analyst has no intimate knowledge of it. Statistics are consistently used as a technology of the educated elite to discuss the lower classes and subaltern populations, those individuals that are considered unknowable and untrustworthy of delivering their own accounts of their daily life. A demand for statistical proof is blatant distrust of someone’s lived experience. The very demand for statistical proof is otherizing because it defines the subject as an outsider, not worthy of the benefit of the doubt.

What does this look like in practical terms? A white woman can say that a neighborhood is “sketchy” and most people will smile and nod. She felt unsafe, and we automatically trust her opinion. A black man can tell the world that every day he lives in fear of the police, and suddenly everyone demands statistical evidence to prove that his life experience is real. Anything approaching a “post-racial society” would not require different types of evidence to tell our life stories: anecdotal evidence for white people, statistics for black people. To the media that’s constantly demanding that lived experiences be backed up by statistics, here’s a fact check of your own: Your demand for statistical proof is racist.

### 2NC---AT Cap Good

#### Capitalism is parasitic on black incapacity.

Bledsoe & Wright 19, \*Adam, assistant professor in the Department of Geography and African American Studies Program at Florida State University. \*\*Willie Jamaal, assistant professor of geography at Florida State University. (“The anti-Blackness of global capital”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, Vol. 37(1), https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775818805102)

Colonial ethics reverberate in the present

The increasing globalization of capital and spatial marginalization of “superfluous” populations is fundamentally tied to the negation of Black life and assumptions of Black nonbeing. The treatment of Black lives as the embodied absence of value, or, “the very condition of existence and the determination of value,” underpins Black non-being and the assumed lack of Black cartographic capacity in the dominant spatial imaginary, making global capitalism possible (Ferreira da Silva, 2017: 1). The interconnected nature of capitalism and race is a well-worn topic. Scholars have theorized race as an ideological outgrowth of the economy (Hall, 1996); as an apparatus used to facilitate flows of people and commodities (Lowe, 2015); as a central component of capitalist maturation (James, 1989); and as a phenomenon necessary for the establishment of the world system (Robinson, 2000), among countless other approaches. Geographers, too, have unpacked the ways in which regimes of capitalism employ racialized concepts to reproduce. Geographic interrogations of racial capitalism have analyzed the role of racist assumptions in implementing neoliberal reforms in the wake of a natural disaster (Derickson, 2014); the manipulation of racial distinction to prevent labor organizing (Wilson, 2000); how resistance to Black landownership underpinned early 20th-century industrial agriculture (Williams, 2017); the role of capitalism in perpetuating environmental racism (Pulido, 2017); and the centrality of plantation relations to numerous variations of capitalism (Woods, 1998).

Nonetheless, we must push further to explicate the ways in which capitalism is actually dependent on anti-Blackness to realize itself, instead of understanding anti-Black racism as a secondary effect of the economy or a phenomenon that emerges periodically. That is to say, reflections on the interlinked nature of race and capitalism must move beyond an assumption of economic causality and grapple with the ways in which anti-Blackness is actually an always-present precondition for capital accumulation. In explicating anti-Blackness, we draw on an Afro-Pessimist framework, as Afro-Pessimism makes distinct claims about the nature of Blackness in the modern world. An Afro-Pessimist analysis of antiBlackness does not treat anti-Black racism as a contingent phenomenon (Wilderson, 2011: 3–4) but rather as a global, ever-present factor that exists as the basis “for expansion and unending space within the symbolic economy of settlement” (King, 2014). Such an approach forces us to recognize how anti-Blackness punctuates the modern epoch by identifying the underlying logics that inform concrete manifestations of anti-Black racism around the world. In this way, Afro-Pessimism adds new dimensions to already-existing work on the connections between anti-Blackness and political economy by recognizing that, while capitalism exploits all of the world’s populations, it does not dominate all of them in the same way. With regard to the question of space, anti-Blackness helps us understand how the afterlife of slavery (Hartman, 2007: 6) leads to Black populations being conceptually unable to legitimately create space, thereby leaving locations associated with Blackness open to the presumably “rational” agendas of dominant spatial actors. Black populations, then, serve as the guarantor of capitalism’s need to constantly find new spaces of accumulation. In this section, we offer an explanation of how capitalism relies on anti-Blackness by foregrounding anti-Blackness as a phenomena with its own internal logics and concrete expressions.

Capitalism is rooted in violent forms of captivity and murder unleashed on indigenous and Afro-descendant populations the world over (Ferreira da Silva, 2004; James, 1989; Rodney, 1972; Williams, 2014; Wynter, 1995). At its origin and in its contemporary manifestations, then, capitalism is systemically related to slavery and its various global permutations (Robinson, 2000: 313–314). The assumption that Black populations lack both humanity and “space, that is ethno- or politico-geography,” defines the treatment of enslaved Black peoples. Today, the assumed a-spatiality that defined conditions of chattel slavery continues to imprint the socio-spatial relations that reproduce global capital (Robinson, 2000: 81, 200).

Black populations are deemed a-spatial as a result of the fact that modern notions of space and practices of spatial production are rooted in specific relations of power (Massey, 2005: 64, 100–101). These power relations are themselves organized around logics that have particular historical roots (Santos, 2008: 21). In the colonial epoch, chattel slavery—the social, legal, and political reduction of Africans to the status of nonhumans—produced the figure of the Black, which had a nullified spatial capacity (Wilderson, 2010: 279), was disavowed as a human being (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 91), and was a priori structurally prevented from enacting “rational” spatial expressions (Santos, 2009: 24). Locations associated with Black populations became wholly “unhallowed” spaces, which would never receive recognition as legitimately occupied (Wynter, 1976: 81). This is not to suggest that Black peoples were or are understood as not physically present. Black bodies are certainly recognized as existing in exteriority (Raffestin, 2012: 129). Still, this recognition of physical presence does not signify that Black populations’ are understood as establishing legible space. Despite physical presence, Black populations nonetheless remain rendered “ungeographic” in dominant understandings of space (McKittrick, 2006: x). Hence, the geographic locations in which Black populations reside are treated as open to the varied agendas espoused by dominant spatial actors.

Capitalism’s new rounds of accumulation require access to spaces that previously had different relations to capitalist practices. The assumed a-spatiality of Black populations often leads to purveyors of capitalism treating locations inhabited by Black people as available for emerging modes of accumulation. Put another way, spaces that were once marginal or peripheral to the perpetuation of capital accumulation become sites of appropriation precisely because the (Black) populations occupying them receive no recognition as viable spatial actors. The spaces necessary for new forms of accumulation are thus conceptually open because of this assumed a-spatiality and subsequently physically opened via the spatial removal and dispersal of Black residents. This dispersal entails violent actions that are a priori legitimate because of the assumed lack of Black spatial agency. In other words, new spaces of “investment have been mapped onto previous racial and colonial (imperial) discourses and practices” evidencing an inextricable relationship between anti-Black notions of space, capitalism’s logic of perpetual expansion, and the acceptable subordination of Black physical presence (Chakravartty and Silva, 2012: 368). This is what Frank Wilderson terms the “deterritorialisation of Black space” (2003: 238) that is necessary for accumulating capital vis-a`-vis emerging political economic practices. Katherine McKittrick similarly notes that Black geographies are cast as “the lands of no one” and “emptied out of life” in order that “suitable capitalist life-support systems” be put into place and globally propagated (McKittrick, 2013: 7).

A number of present-day practices demonstrate the reliance of capital on this notion of empty, lifeless, Blackened spaces, such as capital disinvestment, white flight, gentrification, urban renewal, incarceration, and policing. These spatial arrangements identify Black peoples as inhuman and locations associated with Black populations as lacking a legitimate form of occupation and usage. Such assumptions contribute to the subordination of Black populations and spaces to dominant notions of “appropriate” uses of space, while “illegitimate” spaces of Blackness remain under siege by purveyors of capital. As this occurs, new spaces of accumulation open in areas formerly peripheral to the capitalist agenda. At the same time that these new rounds of accumulation take place, sovereign expressions of power serve to forcibly remove Black people and ensure they remain separated from these new spaces of accumulation. Subsequently, Black people are routinely harassed for existing in the communal spaces in which they have resided for generations.1

Along with public policy shifts, policing, incarceration, and extrajudicial killings simultaneously disqualify Black spatial agency and remove Black bodies from spaces deemed open for appropriation by capitalism’s purveyors, thereby simultaneously spatializing antiBlackness and reproducing global capital. The systemic casting of Black spaces as lifeless and open to appropriation for the continuation of capital breathes new life into “civil society’s political economy: [the Black body] kick-starts...capital at its genesis and rescues it from its over-accumulation crisis at its end—black death is its condition of possibility” (Wilderson, 2003: 238). Put simply, the endless accumulation of capital and its legitimating sovereign practices are, in part, made possible through the continued societal insistence on Black inhumanity and a Black lack of cartography, which casts Black spaces as empty.

Hence, there exists an unquestionable connection between the colonial logics inaugurated centuries ago and today’s capitalist agenda. The lack of recognition of Black humanity underpins both projects. Early capitalism flourished thanks to the relegation of enslaved Blacks to the ontological and legal condition of non-humans on the plantations, in the forests, and in the mines of the Americas, while slaveholders and early insurance companies made fortunes off their investments in the transatlantic slave trade. Similarly, real estate speculation (Harvey, 2010), urban renewal (Perry, 2013), the roll-back of social wages (Wacquant, 2009), and the explosion of prisons (Gilmore, 2007)—all of which have allowed present-day capitalism to continue its agenda of accumulation—are only possible via the understanding of spaces inhabited by Black populations as empty and naming and treating those same populations as abject, inhuman beings. In this way, the anti-Blackness and assumed lack of Black being that originated in and defined the colonial epoch remains present with us today, despite the new material practices and justifications it takes on.

Anti-Blackness remains an ever-present condition, defining the modern world. Scholars can and should look to Black thinkers and activists to help make sense of the interrelated phenomena of anti-Blackness and global capital, as Black grassroots actors explicate the linkages between these phenomena (Burton, 2015).

## ADVANTAGE 1

### 1NC [1]---Innovation Thumpers

#### Confusion and technical deficits thump.

Kampmark 21, was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. (Binoy, 2-26-2021, "War Mongering for Artificial Intelligence", *International Policy Digest*, https://intpolicydigest.org/warmongering-for-artificial-intelligence/)

Internal changes are also suggested to ruffle a few feathers. The US State Department comes in for special mention as needing reforms. “There is currently no clear lead for emerging technology policy or diplomacy within the State Department, which hinders the Department’s ability to make strategic technology decisions.” Allies and partners were confused when approaching the State Department as to “which senior official would be their primary point of contact” for a range of topics, be they AI, quantum computing, 5G, biotechnology, or new emerging technologies.

Overall, the US government comes in for a battering, reproached for operating “at human speed not machine speed.” It was lagging relative to commercial development of AI. It suffered from “technical deficits that range from digital workforce shortages to inadequate acquisition policies, insufficient network architecture, and weak data practices.”

#### Immigration freezes wreck innovation---outweighs their internal.

Hao 20, artificial intelligence senior reporter for MIT Technology Review. (Karen, 6-26-2020, "Trump’s freeze on new visas could threaten US dominance in AI", *MIT Technology Review*, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/26/1004520/trump-executive-order-h1b-visa-threatens-us-ai/)

Even before president Trump’s executive order on June 22, the US was already bucking global tech immigration trends. Over the past five years, as other countries have opened up their borders to highly skilled technical people, the US has maintained—and even restricted—its immigration policies, creating a bottleneck for meeting domestic demand for tech talent.Now Trump’s decision to suspend a variety of work visas has left many policy analysts worried about what it could mean for long-term US innovation. In particular, the suspension of the H-1B, a three-year work visa granted to foreign workers in specialty fields and one of the primary channels for highly skilled tech workers to join the US workforce, could impact US dominance in critical technologies such as AI. “America’s key competitors are going in a different direction,” says Tina Huang, a research analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). “Historically the US has relied on talent from elsewhere to fuel the country’s technological dominance, and its key competitor nations are aware of this.” It’s likely those competitors will now use this window of opportunity to double down on attracting talent away from the US, she says, by designing even more expedited and lenient immigration policies. Trump’s move to bar foreigners from working in the US is part of the administration’s broader push to keep US jobs for Americans. In the months leading up to the decision, senior White House advisor Stephen Miller argued that the economic downturn caused by the pandemic has only increased the need to stem the flow of immigration. But the argument assumes that for every foreign worker turned away, an American worker is capable of taking their place. While there exists some debate about whether this could be true for the tech industry at large, says Huang, it is definitely not for AI. In fact, the majority of the US’s wealth of AI talent comes from abroad. A recent analysis from the think tank MacroPolo found that 69% of AI researchers working at US institutions received their undergraduate degrees from outside the US. Two-thirds of graduate students in the US’s top AI-related PhD programs are also international, with roughly 80% of them staying five years after graduation. Even so, the US still suffers from an AI talent shortage, exacerbated by existing immigration policies without the latest restrictions. Anecdotally, US-based AI researchers have long lamented the impact of unfriendly visa limits on their pace of innovation. In February 2019, when president Trump signed an executive order to institute a national AI strategy, Oren Etzioni, the CEO of the research nonprofit Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, argued in an op-ed that the move was critically missing a special visa program for AI experts. On Twitter, Ian Goodfellow, Apple’s director of machine learning, concurred: “My collaborators' visa restrictions have been one of the largest bottlenecks to our collective research productivity over the last few years,” he said. Trump’s executive order will likely only make this shortage worse. CSET estimates that at least 35% of H-1B holders have an AI-related degree, and nearly three-quarters work in computing-related fields. Though the Trump administration hasn’t indicated how long the current visa suspensions could last, it has already contributed to “a growing sense of instability,” Zachary Arnold, a research fellow at CSET, says. As a result, more foreign nationals could choose not to bring their talents to the US because of uncertainty surrounding their ability to stay. Where would they go instead? In their latest report Huang and Arnold identified Canada, the UK, France, and Australia as the US’s top competitors for AI talent. All four have declared an intent to build their national AI capacity and adopted or proposed major immigration reforms to attract more AI workers in the last five years. In contrast to the US’s annual cap of 85,000 H-1B visas and seven-month to one-year application processing times, none of them have caps or wait times more than three months. Huang and Arnold worry that the US’s short-sightedness in immigration policy could have lasting repercussions for the country. “Talent is a foundational input to AI,” Arnold says. “It’s the fundamental resource that drives everything else.” Thus if the US wants to maintain its competitiveness, it needs to exempt AI talent from current visa caps and create clear pathways for those individuals to maintain permanent residency. But should the US continue in the direction of Trump’s executive order, Canada, in particular, is patiently waiting with open arms. In Silicon Valley, the Canadian government has paid for billboards that pointedly read “H-1B Problems? Pivot to Canada.”

### 1NC [4]---!D---NoKo

#### No Korea war---assumes tech advancements.

Post 21, Commander, U.S. Navy, Ph.D. candidate studying international relations at Brown University. His research centers on nuclear deterrence strategy, policy, and the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, with a focus on the concept of limited nuclear war. He is currently serving in his 20th year of active duty naval service and is assigned to the Permanent Military Professor Program at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. (Daniel, 1-29-2021, "Deterring North Korea", *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/deterring-north-korea/>)

Do These Principles Apply to North Korea?

With these principles in mind, can deterrence continue to work vis-a-vis North Korea? In short, yes. Throughout the evolution of the U.S-North Korean deterrence relationship, vulnerability has played an important role in the nuclear strategies and policies of both sides. The vulnerability of U.S. allies and assets in the region to North Korea’s intermediate-range missile and artillery barrages has almost certainly been a check on a more aggressive U.S. strategy, whether geared toward nonproliferation or regime change. It is certainly plausible that in the absence of this vulnerability the chances of the U.S. preventively attacking North during the Trump administration would have been higher, especially considering the extremely hawkish views of his national security adviser in 2017. As a result of this vulnerability, the U.S. routinely demonstrates its dedication to security agreements with allies in word and deed. Strategic bomber flights and military exercises, for example, demonstrate to North Korea their own vulnerability to U.S. and allied power in the region. Conversely, although the Kim regime would like nothing more than to unify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean leadership (dubbed the “holy grail of North Korean statecraft” in a recent report), it has refrained from overt and aggressive military action in pursuit of this goal. There is no doubt that Kim, like his predecessors, is wary of such behavior in the face of U.S. and allied military capabilities. Today, North Korea remains vulnerable to U.S. nuclear attacks, while the United States and its regional partners remain vulnerable to nuclear attack or retaliation from North Korea. This mutual vulnerability necessitates caution on both sides.

Recent progress in North Korean missile technology have made portions of the U.S. mainland vulnerable, giving the U.S. further reason to avoid unnecessary provocation. In 2017, North Korea conducted several tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, two of which demonstrated the capability to potentially reach the continental United States. More recently, North Korea has successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile and has showcased a new and larger submarine-launched ballistic missile at a recent parade. As a result, the United States continues to invest significantly in homeland missile defense, as well as to deploy missile defenses to defend allies and assets in the region. Missile defenses likely contribute to increased feelings of vulnerability among Kim’s regime, which may see the build-up as a prelude to a military offensive. Though imperfect, these attempts to reduce vulnerability enhance deterrence by potentially denying North Korea the expected military gains from a limited missile attack, even as fully effective missile defenses might contribute to strategic instability. Regardless of their effectiveness, Kim will have to factor in these defensive capabilities when assessing the success of engaging in conflict and will question the ability to achieve even limited goals through limited means. For example, in order to ensure the success of a missile attack, Kim would have to increase the size of the salvo in order to compensate for missiles likely to be shot down by U.S. and allied defenses. But knowing that a larger initial attack would be perceived as particularly aggressive and would likely invite a larger counter-attack, he might be deterred from pursuing whatever limited gains a smaller attack might have achieved. From Kim’s perspective, U.S. military capabilities are more than sufficient to make military success for North Korea in any conflict appear difficult and costly. Vulnerability to severe retaliation and punishment from U.S. strategic forces is also currently unavoidable for Kim. In fact, this very vulnerability has driven the North Korean nuclear program toward a capability to directly threaten the U.S., thereby demonstrating its own acknowledgement of vulnerability. In sum, both sides are vulnerable to each other. Most importantly for U.S. decision-makers, there is no likely development in the near to medium term that might remove this sense of vulnerability from Kim’s mind.

### 1NC [5]---Sanctions Fail

#### Sanctions fail.

Kusa 20, Kyiv-based author and analyst of international relations with the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. (Iliya, 8-13-2020, "Sanctions Against Russia: Rethinking the West’s Approach", *Wilson Center*, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/sanctions-against-russia-rethinking-wests-approach)

However, there are several major drawbacks to the Western sanctions against Russia. First, the sanctions are not complex. Often they don’t cover the whole targeted sector, and consequently their impact is partial. For example, restrictions imposed against Russian rocket fuel do not include some types of chemicals that could be used to produce this fuel.

Second, some sanctions have already become ineffectual. For instance, since 2014 the Russian government has found multiple ways to circumvent European and US sanctions imposed because of the annexation of Crimea. These sanctions have not been changed or updated in six years. Moreover, part of the Crimean sanctions package was dormant from the very beginning. Sanctions might have worked had Russia had tried to develop a civilian economy on the peninsula, which it did not.

Third, the political aspect, especially its European dimension, creates additional obstacles to preserving the sanctions regime and therefore deterring Russia. EU sanctions were introduced after a series of multilayered, complex negotiations involving the EU’s twenty-eight member states and their respective governments. With each passing year, enthusiasm for sanctions among the European states wanes under pressure from the industrial lobby, business communities, and traders, making it less and less possible to preserve the EU’s sanctions in their original form.

As a result of these drawbacks, Russia appears to have suffered only minimally economically, successfully overcoming the initial shock from sanctions. Russia’s GDP grew from 0.3 percent in 2016 to 2.3 percent in 2018, and the structure of Russia-EU trade hasn’t changed dramatically, with trade in some sectors and markets even growing through the years. Of the sanctions-imposing states, Germany has benefited the most from continuing trade with Russia.

### 1NC [6]---Solvency

#### The plan triggers re-consolidation---empirics.

Karabell 20, WIRED contributor and president of River Twice Research. (Zachary, 1-23-2020, "Don't Break Up Big Tech", *Wired*, https://www.wired.com/story/dont-break-up-big-tech/)

The problems fueling “break them up” are valid; breaking them up is not the solution. To begin with, antitrust enforcement has been romanticized well in excess of its accomplishments. The breakup in 1984 of the monopolistic AT&T into eight companies unleashed competition for a time, lowering prices and improving services. Eventually, however, as landlines gave way to wireless, the industry reconsolidated and regulators relaxed. Today telecom is dominated by a reconstituted AT&T along with Verizon, with Sprint as a distant third (yet still immense) player. The court-mandated breakup of Standard Oil in 1911 was the culmination of the most significant antitrust action ever, but the company’s dozens of offshoots eventually recombined into massive oil companies that maintain tremendous power. (ExxonMobil and Chevron are the two most notable.) That breakup also made the wealthy Rockefeller family even wealthier, as their shares in one company became shares in many—almost all of which doubled quickly and then continued their upward trajectory from there.

It’s debatable whether antitrust enforcement has ever been particularly effective. Even a charitable reading of its legacy suggests that the first effect of disrupting Big Tech might be to enrich the oligopoly’s shareholders, which is certainly not what advocates would want. In fact, as I argued in that earlier WIRED column, industrial conglomerates often spin off businesses strategically. For instance, United Technologies is about to cut loose its multibillion-dollar divisions Otis Elevators and Carrier (one of the world’s largest HVAC companies) as a means of unlocking shareholder value. One wonders why Silicon Valley executives haven’t gone down this path; perhaps the mantras of integration and a hubristic belief that they will never actually be forced to break up has shut down consideration of those strategies.

Would a forced breakup at least be effective at dispersing power? Let’s say that Facebook were strong-armed into disassembling itself. Its logical components would be legacy Facebook (individual pages), Facebook for business, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Oculus. You might be able to slice it even thinner, but assume Facebook would become five companies. Facebook currently has a market capitalization of just over $600 billion. That total market cap wouldn’t be divided equally among the five new companies; WhatsApp might struggle given its lack of discernible income, while Instagram might soar. It’s likely, however, that the resulting businesses would have a combined valuation greater than $600 billion, assuming it follows past patterns and that the tech industry remains robust.

Now imagine each of the Big Tech giants gets disassembled in this way. We might end up with a landscape of 30 companies instead of half a dozen. A quintupling of industry players would, by definition, create a more competitive field. But competition in the antitrust framework, stretching back to the original Sherman Anti-Trust Bill in 1890 and then subsequent legislation such as the Clayton Bill in 1914, is not a virtue or need in and of itself. It is the means to a set of ends—namely, “economic liberty,” unfettered trade, lower prices, and better services for consumers. By itself, competition does not guarantee anything.

Meanwhile, it’s hard to see how going from six companies to 30 would give consumers any more choice of services or more control over their data, or how it would help to nurture small businesses and lower costs to consumers and society. Perhaps there would be openings for companies with different business models, ones that brand themselves as valuing privacy and empowering individual ownership of data. This can’t be ruled out, but the nature of data selling and data mining is so embedded in the current models of most IT companies that it is very hard to see how such businesses could thrive unless they charged more to consumers than consumers have so far been willing to pay. In the meantime, the 30 new megacompanies would still have immense competitive advantages over smaller startups.

Would the market frictions and disruptions caused by a breakup be worth the possibility that such privacy-focused companies might succeed? Would cracking the current megacompanies into a set of slightly smaller ones effectively balance consumer needs and economic liberty? You may need to break eggs to make an omelet, but breaking eggs alone doesn’t make one.

### 1NC [7]---Circumvention

#### They’ll read down the plan---statutory codification fails.

Crane 21, Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. (Daniel A., “Antitrust Antitextualism”, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1205, pg. 1207, Accessible at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol96/iss3/7/)

But it gets worse. The courts have not merely abandoned statutory textualism or other modes of faithful interpretation out of a commitment to a dynamic common-law process. Rather, they have departed from text and original meaning in one consistent direction—toward reading down the antitrust statutes in favor of big business. As detailed in this Article, this unilateral process began almost immediately upon the promulgation of the Sherman Act and continues to this day. In brief: within their first decade of antitrust jurisprudence, the courts read an atextual rule of reason into section 1 of the Sherman Act to transform an absolute prohibition on agreements restraining trade into a flexible standard often invoked to bless large business combinations; after Congress passed two reform statutes in 1914, the courts incrementally read much of the textual distinctiveness out of the statutes to lessen their anticorporate bite; the courts have read the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act almost out of existence; and the Celler-Kefauver Amendments of 1950, faithfully followed in the years immediately after their promulgation, have been watered down to textually unrecognizable levels by judicial interpretation and agency practice. It is no exaggeration to say that not one of the principal substantive antitrust statutes has been consistently interpreted by the courts in a way faithful to its text or legislative intent, and that the arc of antitrust antitexualism has bent always in favor of capital.

Unlike in many debates over statutory interpretation, the issue in antitrust is not a contest between strict textualism and purposivism, including resort to legislative history.6 This Article uses “antitextualism” as a shorthand for the phenomenon of ignoring any bona fide construction of what a statute means, whether in the plain meaning of its words, linguistic or substantive interpretive canons, legislative history, or other ordinary markers of legislative meaning. Uninterested in these methods, the courts have treated the antitrust laws as a virtually unbounded delegation of common-law powers when, in important ways, the statutes quite clearly say something other than that.

## ADVANTAGE 2

### 1NC [1]---!D---Emerging Tech

#### No AI military applications.

Dr. Michael C. Horowitz 18, Professor of Political Science and the Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, May, "Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power," Texas National Security Review, https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/

However, it is not yet clear how the invention of specific AI applications will translate into military power. Despite continuing investment, efforts to integrate AI technologies into militaries have been limited.39 Project Maven is the first activity of an “Algorithmic Warfare” initiative in the U.S. military designed to harness the potential of AI and translate it into usable military capabilities. Still, many investments in the United States and elsewhere are in early stages. As Missy L. Cummings writes: Autonomous ground vehicles such as tanks and transport vehicles are in development worldwide, as are autonomous underwater vehicles. In almost all cases, however, the agencies developing these technologies are struggling to make the leap from development to operational implementation.40 It is important to distinguish these potential technological innovations from military innovations. While military innovations are often linked to changes in technology,41 it is not always the case. Military innovations are significant changes in organizational behavior and ways that a military fights that are designed to increase its ability to effectively translate capabilities into power.42 The use of aircraft carriers as mobile airfields by the United States and Japan is a prototypical example. While AI could potentially enable a number of military innovations, it is not a military innovation itself, and no applications of AI have been used in ways that would count as a military innovation at this point. Because AI research and technology are still in their early stages, usage of AI in warfare is not even yet analogous to the first use of the tank in World War I, let alone effective use of combined arms warfare by the Germans in World War II (the military innovation now known as blitzkrieg). This limits analyses about how narrow AI might one day affect the balance of power and international politics. Most research on technology and international politics focuses on specific, mature technologies, such as nuclear weapons, or on military innovations.43 Since AI is at an early stage, examining it requires adapting existing theories about military technology and military innovation.44

### 1NC [2]---!D---US-China War

#### I’ll finish Lei

to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

### 2NC---!D---Heg

#### Heg doesn’t create peace.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46

Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

### 2NC---!D---Cyber

#### No cyber impact.

Lewis 20, PhD, a senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. (James Andrew, 8-17-2020, "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe", *CSIS*, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe)

A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack.

To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With ~~man-made~~ actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge.

It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted.

More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are:

Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.

There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)

No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare.

State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war.

This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation.

The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.

One major failing of catastrophe scenarios is that they discount the robustness and resilience of modern economies. These economies present multiple targets and configurations; they are harder to damage through cyberattack than they look, given the growing (albeit incomplete) attention to cybersecurity; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild. This was one of the counterintuitive lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Pre-war planning assumed that civilian morale and production would crumple under aerial bombardment. In fact, the opposite occurred. Resistance hardened and production was restored.1

This is a short overview of why catastrophe is unlikely. Several longer CSIS reports go into the reasons in some detail. Past performance may not necessarily predict the future, but after 25 years without a single catastrophic cyberattack, we should invoke the concept cautiously, if at all. Why then, it is raised so often?

# 1NR

## K

### 1NR---AT Perm

#### Damage control DA. The perm is a liberal corrective that interposes Black radical theorizing between genocidal logics.

King 17, Assistant Professor of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. (Tiffany, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”, *Critical Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pg. 173-174)

As an example of how the protocols, codes of conduct, and politesse of postcolonial “business as usual” unfold in the university, I reflect on my encounters as a student and now professor in the graduate classroom, reading scholarly texts, listening, and taking part in scholarly critique and the collegial repartee that occurs at academic conferences. Within these scenarios, I have observed the decorum of supposedly “engaged and rigorous” critique proceed in the following ways. Often postcolonial interventions into colonial or critical theory travel through phases, stages of progression, and levels of engagement with continental philosophy. First, in order to demonstrate your scholarly due diligence, capacity for rigor, and abstraction, you must learn and rehearse the origins of and become fluent in the language, idioms, and grammar of Deleuze and Guattari or whichever white scholar is in fashion. Second, you must figuratively inhabit and empathize with the white scholar’s very personal and particular existential and ethical questions (even if you cannot relate to her particular kind of situatedness or experience). It is often in graduate seminars where you have been asked—and we have been trained as faculty—to have you think about what it must have been like to be Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, or Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in the moment in which they lived. Imagine the trials and tribulations of being a European bourgeois male maverick in the academy and civil society. In other words, you must internalize and perform this worldview as if it applies to you. After you internalize and perform, the third thing that you are allowed but by no means required to do is list the problems with this theory or worldview. Once you have identified the problems, even irreconcilable ones, you are encouraged to make an intervention or slight adjustment to the discourse or theory by asserting that you will now put Indigenous or Black life at the center of this body of thought. The challenge or intervention usually reads as “what if we put Native or Black studies at the center of Deleuzoguattarian thought?”

Although we may become disillusioned with and challenge a metanarrative, we are rarely encouraged to do what Eve Tuck does when she “Break[s] Up with Deleuze.” We are often prevented from getting to this stage of exasperation or justified disgust because we are not allowed to stop, look at, and more importantly feel the violence of Western turns in critical theory. Because of academic respectability politics that impose a kind of bourgeois politesse on all “communicative acts,” be they in person or in writing, it is impolite and more importantly irrational to be rendered devastated, enraged, mute, or immobile by the violent terms on which continental theory proceeds. One must tolerate that Deleuzoguattarian rhizomatic movements require Indigenous genocide. In fact, it is a necessary evil in order for the West to model the kind of unfettered nomadic movement that Deleuze and Guattari privilege. The neoliberal temporality of productivity also requires that scholars keep moving unaffected in the midst of the violence. In fact, one is required to work through and repair or do damage control for Deleuze and Guattari. This is what a “good scholar” does: puts Black or Native studies at the center of rhizomes rather than contesting the very terms in which lines of flight become epistemic entities. But how do we perform or act otherwise in the face of this kind of violence?

I am not arguing that academics should not read Deleuze and Guattari. As scholars committed to decolonial thought, we should read their work and understand how genocide and colonialism flow through it. However, we can read without becoming seduced and attached to the work. I turn again to the writings of Black and Native feminists as an example of what this critical disinterest and refusal might look like.32 As Simpson and Tuck and Yang argue, refusal can reroute one set of concerns and questions and redirect them toward other pursuits. Better yet, disenchantment and pessimism can compel one to perceive or think about new questions. Refusal and misandry can move you out of the circuit that the corporate university imposes on critical thinking: know, internalize, perform, disagree, and then center yourself.

### 1NR---Hegemony Link

#### That outweighs and turns the aff — maintaining US dominance over I-Law ensures serial policy failure.

Parmar 18, Professor of International Politics @ University of London (Inderjeet, The US-led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name? *International Affairs*, 151–172; DOI: 10.1093/ia/iix240)

Conclusion

The foundational values, interests and institutions of the (Anglo-)US liberal international order, with due respect for important but not fundamental recalibrations and corrections along the way, are the sources of its current crises or at least challenges. The mentalities and power structures of the LIO’s leaders are constructed by hierarchical, imperial and racial–civilizational ways of thinking, albeit in most cases subliminally embedded to the point of being unconscious deep structures themselves.117 The American white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (Wasp) establishment built and maintained the liberal order in a ‘competitively cooperative’ alliance with their British counterparts,118 whose own imperial and racial mentalities were hardly in conflict with those of their American cousins.119 Whatever changes occurred or were forced on US elites over time, those underlying and mainly subliminal values have remained significant in decision-making, including when nurturing new states and powers such as South Korea and China.

As a result, liberal internationalism as a ‘theory’ or approach to world order, eliding and skirting matters of hierarchy, race and class just as it does in its outline understandings of American democracy, misses a critical part of the picture—of the dynamics of international power as well as the dynamics of domestic power. Because of that elision, that failure to see, I suggest it is a legitimating ideology of the American ruling elite. I have argued above that the LIO is better understood as a system of hierarchy and inequality, and as what Persaud calls a ‘racio-civilizational’ phenomenon. What does that mean? It means that this system and its leaders cannot yet comprehend an order that encompasses on the basis of something approaching equality the broad mass of people—citizens—at home, let alone the non-western peoples of the global South, or even their elites. The tweet from Donald Tusk quoted above is revealing and instructive because it was addressed to President Trump in simple and stark terms, worth repeating here: ‘Euro-Atlanticism means the free world cooperating to prevent post-West world order’—so, please ‘do not touch’. International alliances of elites, including those of the emerging powers such as China, are in large part attempts to manage and channel change to prevent radical power shifts, to sustain a world order that serves elites and masses, in West and East, in starkly unequal ways. A Gramscian–Kautskyian synthesis combines consideration of domestic and international class-based imperial hegemonies and offers a good explanation of the existing order. However, it also offers a way out, in theory, and provides ways to assess the likelihood of avenues towards egalitarianism being taken by ruling elites. The prognosis is not positive at present, although the bases of ways forward appear to be coming into view as political strife and electoral shocks challenge the status quo.120